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Developments in the financing of corporations are often traced by look-
ing at financial ratios for the corporate sector as a whole. For many years,
in both academic and business publications, patterns in these ratios have
been observed, interpreted, and sometimes decried.
1 There is little con-
sensus on what these patterns mean, however, and even some disagree-
ment over what the patterns have been. Some studies, for example, argue
that corporate debt ratios have increased sharply over the past two to
three decades, and they point to such factors as inflation and the tax
system to explain this trend.
2 Other studies assert that the corporate
debt-equity mix has exhibited remarkable secular stability.
3
Several factors have contributed to this lack of consensus. First, finan-
cial ratios can be measured in a variety of different units, such as book
value versus market value or stocks versus flows. Different measure-
ments are subject to different biases and thus present different pictures of
the trends in corporate finance. Second, different time periods have been
used to trace the behavior of these ratios. Studies emphasizing increased
use of corporate debt, for example, focus generally on the post-World
War II period, while those arguing for debt ratio stability typically
encompass a longer period overall but do not include the most recent
years' experience. Third, attempts to interpret financing trends have
been hampered by the lack of a theoretical framework. With few excep-
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tions, previous studies have discussed these trends without reference to a
detailed model.
4 Although this may seem odd in view of corporate capital
structure's place among the central theoretical issues in finance, it should
be kept in mind that many of the academic studies of aggregate financing
trends came before theoretical work had progressed very far.More fun-
damentally, theoretical work that has been conducted has been largely
aimed at the individual firm, and, until very recently, little analysis has
been explicitly devoted to the determinants of corporate finance at the
aggregate level.
5 Much of existing theoretical work, then, has not made it
clear what to look for in attempting to explain secular financing patterns
for the corporate sector as a whole.
In view of these difficulties, the purpose of the current study is to
broaden existing perspectives on both the measurement and theory of
corporate financing trends. One premise of this effort is that stepping
back and looking at the longest possible period with different types of
data will resolve some of the controversy over what these trends have
been. A second premise is that the determinants of these trends can be
further illuminated by examining current capital structure theories with
the specific aim of drawing out their implications for aggregate financing
patterns.
The paper consists of four sections. In section 1.1, the measurement
issue is addressed. Observations from a number of previous studies are
gathered and updated in order to present the broadest possible view of
corporate financing trends from the beginning of this century to the
present. Section 1.2 undertakes the first step in interpreting these trends
by reviewing available capital structure theory. The major aim of this
review is to identify the determinants of aggregate supplies and demands
for corporate securities relative to competing securities in the capital
market. In section 1.3, a very preliminary test is presented of existing
theory's ability to explain the capital structure trends described in section
1.1. This is done by comparing trends in capital structure determinants,
as predicted by existing theory, with the capital structure trends them-
selves. Finally, in section 1.4, some suggestions are offered for improving
the ability of capital structure theory to explain the evolution of aggregate
corporate financing patterns over time. These suggestions center around
providing a fuller description of the role of corporate financing activities
in the context of the financial system as a whole.
To preview some of the major conclusions, it is found that there has
been an undeniable trend toward greater use of debt financing by cor-
porations in the post-World War II period. Nevertheless, the relative
level of corporate debt was unusually low around the time of World War
II, and current debt levels are not unprecedented when viewed in the
context of the twentieth century as a whole. The tax system, in conjunc-
tion with inflation, has probably played an important role in the postwar15 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
increases in corporate debt, but these factors appear insufficient to ex-
plain the trends over longer periods of time. In particular, it is argued that
supplies of competing securities, such as federal government bonds, as
well as the secular development of the financial intermediary system, may
also be important determinants of long-run corporate financing patterns.
1.1 Measurement of Capital Structure Trends
Attempts to identify the secular trends in corporate financing encoun-
ter a variety of measurement problems. Comparable data series often are
not available over long periods of time. Accounting conventions are
subject to change, and fluctuations in economic conditions, especially the
rate of inflation, may destroy the comparability of accounting numbers
between periods. Market value numbers may be used in their stead, but
these must be estimated with some error, and it is unclear to what extent
market values reflect the actual financing decisions of corporations and to
what extent they reflect other exogenous factors.
The approach taken here will be to present a variety of different
measures of corporate financing trends and then to try to infer the
common patterns that emerge. Four different types of data have been
used in previous studies of corporate financing, and all four will be
presented sequentially in the sections that follow. These include book
value, market value, replacement cost, and flow-of-funds data. Each type
of measurement has its problems and advantages, and these will be
discussed as the data are presented.
Throughout the ensuing discussion, primary attention is devoted to
corporations' relative use of debt and equity financing. This has been the
focal point of most previous attempts to trace patterns in corporate
financing and of capital structure theory as well. Where possible, how-
ever, trends in preferred stock, external versus internal equity, and
short-term versus long-term debt will also be noted.
1.1.1 Book Value Balance Sheet Data
Perhaps the simplest approach to assessing corporate financing pat-
terns is to examine changes in the composition of the liability side of the
corporate balance sheet. This was the approach adopted by Miller (1963),
for example, in a study undertaken for the Commission on Money and
Credit. The Internal Revenue Service compiles balance sheet data both
for U.S. corporations in the aggregate and for U.S. manufacturing cor-
porations, and Miller's study examined these data for the period 1926-56.
Using data through 1979, table 1.1 presents a variety of balance sheet
ratios from this source, including the ratios of long-term debt and pre-
ferred stock to total capital. These data are plotted in figure 1.1.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income.
Note: LD = long-term bonds and notes; P = preferred stock; TC = total long-term capital
= long-term debt + preferred stock + common equity; D = total debt; A = total assets.
long-term capital fluctuate but exhibit virtually no trend through the
mid-1950s. The ratios of total debt (including liabilities of all kinds) to
total assets show some tendency to rise in the late 1930s and early 1940s
but exhibit no trend thereafter until at least the late 1950s.
6 The use of
preferred stock, on the other hand, exhibits a steady secular decline
through the early 1960s.
7
Data that were not available to Miller at the time of his study, however,
suggest that debt ratios have tended to drift steadily upward since the late
1950s. This may indicate a fundamental change in corporate financial
policy, although Miller (1977) has warned that at least some of this
apparent trend may be spurious. Liberalized depreciation allowances
since the early 1960s, for example, would tend to depress reported equity
values and would automatically tend to increase debt ratios. Inflation in
the 1960s and 1970s has also caused distortions in book value measures of
debt ratios. Such measures do not reflect inflation-induced transfers of
value from bondholders to equityholders, for example. By the same
token, inflation causes reported asset values to be understated, thus
giving a misleading impression of the size of corporate debt relative to
assets.
8
If capital markets are efficient, investors should see through these
accounting changes and should also adjust for the effects of inflation.
Some of the problems described above may be circumvented, then, by
the use of market value balance sheet ratios, and it is to these that we now
turn.
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Plot of book value financial ratio data from table 1.1.
1.1.2 Market Value Balance Sheet Data
Since market value data are not available for the nonfinancial corpo-
rate sector as a whole, they must be estimated. A variety of estimates
using somewhat different techniques are presented in table 1.2. Several
of these measures are also plotted in figure 1.2.
The most common approach is to take dividend and interest payments
reported by corporations and to capitalize these at appropriate rates to
obtain estimates of the market values of equity and debt, respectively.
This approach has been followed by Holland and Myers (1979), using the
dividend yield on the Standard and Poor's Composite Index and Moody's
Baa corporate bond rate as capitalization rates. Their estimates, updated
through 1981 are shown in column 1 of table 1.2. Like the accounting19 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
numbers in table 1.1, these estimates suggest that there has been a
considerable increase in corporate debt ratios since the late 1950s. A
major portion of this increase has apparently occurred during the decade
of the 1970s. The increase is not nearly as smooth as the accounting
numbers suggest, however, as dips occur in the early and late 1960s, and
again in the early and late 1970s. Furthermore, although the 1930s and
1940s hardly could be characterized as a normal period, the estimates at
least suggest that the debt ratios occurring in the 1970s are by no means
unprecedented.
The estimates in columns 2 and 3 of table 1.2 are from von Furstenberg
(1977), and they differ in two respects. First, dividend payments for
common and preferred stock have been separated and capitalized at
different rates. Second, von Furstenberg argued that the weighted aver-
age rating of corporate bonds outstanding has tended to be A or slightly
better. He thus capitalized interest payments using the A-rated bond
yield and also attempted to take into account the maturity composition of
corporate debt. His estimates give consistently higher values for corpo-
rate debt ratios than those in Holland and Myers (1979), partly because of
the lower capitalization rate for corporate debt and partly because the
higher dividend yield on preferred stock gives a lower estimate for the
combined market value of common and preferred stock. Nevertheless,
the two series move in unison, with von Furstenberg's estimates also
suggesting a considerable rise in corporate debt ratios since the mid-
1950s. The estimates also reveal that the relative value of preferred stock
has remained low throughout and has generally tended to decline, with
the exception of a modest comeback in the mid-1970s.
A third approach has been followed by Gordon and Malkiel (1981),
who use the sample of nonfinancial corporations for which data are
reported on the Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT Tapes. Market
values of common equity can be observed directly for these companies.
Market values of debt and preferred stock have been estimated using
methods similar to von Furstenberg's but with the estimates derived from
bond and preferred stock prices sampled at the two-digit industry level.
Again, the estimated debt ratios, shown in column 4 of table 1.2, move in
parallel with the other two series, with their absolute magnitudes gener-
ally falling between the other two. The estimates suggest the same
increase in debt ratios, particularly since the late 1950s. Since both the
von Furstenberg and the Gordon and Malkiel estimates range over a
shorter period than those of Holland and Myers, however, they may give
the impression that current debt ratios are higher by historical standards
than is really the case.
The last approach to estimating market values, followed by Ciccolo
(1982), uses observed market values for all securities for samples of
roughly fifty U.S. manufacturing firms. Ciccolo has reported marketI I
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Plot of market value debt ratios from table 1.2.
value balance sheet ratios for the aggregate of his sample firms for
selected years, and these are shown in the last two columns of table 1.2.
The debt ratios are generally much lower than those in the other series
and do not move in parallel with the Holland and Myers estimates for the
early years. The fact that the debt ratios are so much lower for all years
raises the possibility that the sample may not be representative of the
nonfinancial corporate sector as a whole. Nevertheless, Ciccolo's figures
reveal the same increase in debt ratios since the 1960s that the other series
do. Moreover, the preferred stock figures confirm the secular decline in
the importance of preferred stock that appears in the accounting data of
table 1.1.
1.1.3 Replacement Cost Data
Another ratio that has been used in previous studies to measure
corporate leverage is that of the market value of debt to the replacement23 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
value of total assets. Like the market value data, replacement values are
subject to substantial estimation error. However, replacement cost asset
measures alleviate the overstatement in book value debt ratios during
inflationary periods resulting from both the understatement of corporate
assets and the overstatement of debt in real terms. Moreover, as we shall
see in section 1.2, the replacement value of assets may have some theo-
retical advantages as a measure of debt capacity.
1
0 In any case, estimates
of the ratio of the market value of debt to the replacement value of assets
are available over a long period.
Two series of these ratios are available. One is from von Furstenberg's
(1977) study and runs annually from 1952 to 1976, while the other is from
Goldsmith's (Goldsmith et al. 1963) study of national balance sheets.
Goldsmith's estimates are available for selected years from 1900 to 1945
and annually from 1945 to 1958. The two series are shown in table 1.3 and
are plotted in figure 1.3. The figures from Goldsmith et al. suggest that
nonfinancial corporations' use of debt financing relative to the replace-
ment value of their assets was markedly lower in the decade following
World War II than it had been earlier in the century. The figures from von
Furstenberg indicate that corporate debt ratios then rose in the postwar
period. Little trend is apparent after the early 1960s, however, suggesting
that trends in the book value ratios in figure 1.1 may reflect inflationary
distortions.
It can be seen from the years of overlap in the 1950s that there are some
discrepancies between the two series. The ratios derived from Gold-
smith's data, for example, are consistently somewhat lower than von
Furstenberg's.
1
1 Moreover, Goldsmith's series itself may not give compa-
rable data between prewar and postwar periods. Balance sheets from the
prewar period are from Goldsmith (1958) while the annual data from
1945 to 1958 are from Goldsmith et al. (1963). Some changes in sectoral
definitions and estimation methods occurred between these two studies,
and the only year of overlap, 1945, indicates that these changes may have
caused some differences in the debt ratios.
Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Between 1952
and 1958, Goldsmith's and von Furstenberg's series move quite closely
together, and it may be that they would exhibit similar trends throughout
the whole period 1900-1978. If so, it appears that even though corporate
debt ratios increased substantially in the postwar period, particularly
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the debt ratios of recent years are
not unusual by historical standards. Even if it is argued on the basis of the
two 1945 estimates that the prewar figures are overstated by a third, the
debt ratios of the 1960s and 1970s would still represent a return to roughly
the levels that prevailed over the prewar period. The replacement value
data, then, provide some further support for the impression gained from
market value data that, while debt ratios have increased in recent de-24 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
Table 1.3 Balance Sheet Ratios with Debt and Preferred Stock Measured at







































































































































































Sources: Cited in text.
"Figure in parentheses is from Goldsmith (1956). Other figure is from Goldsmith et al.
(1963).
bGordon and Malkiel (1981) update von Furstenberg's figures, using the same estimation
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Fig. 1.3 Ratios of market value of debt to replacement cost of assets
from table 1.3.
cades, after a relatively flat period in the 1940s and 1950s, they are
nevertheless not unusual by prewar standards.
1.1.4 Flow of Funds Data
The final method for measuring corporate financing patterns makes use
of flows of funds over periods of time as opposed to stocks at particular
dates. While this method does not take into account inflation-induced
valuation changes, as market value and replacement value estimates do,
it may nevertheless come closest to recording the actual decisions made
by corporations. Furthermore, since capital consumption allowances are
included as a component of internal equity financing, this method is not
subject to Miller's criticisms about understatement of equity financing in
the wake of changes in depreciation accounting.
1
2
Between Goldsmith's Study of Saving data, which run from 1900 to
1945, and the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts which cover the
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record of corporate financing flows. The data are shown in table 1.4.
Since the emphasis of this paper is on secular patterns in corporate
financing, the flows are divided into periods covering roughly a decade
each.
The same data have previously been examined by Kuznets (1961),
Sametz (1964), and Friedman (1980). Kuznets and Sametz were limited
to the period from 1900 through the late 1950s. Both were struck by the
sharp decline in the use of stock issues as a financing source, and both
argued that internal funds, disregarding the aberrant years of the De-
pression and World War II, had shown at least a modest upward trend
relative to other financing sources. Both authors also pointed out that,
although short-term liabilities fluctuated considerably, they generally
increased relative to both total financing sources and total debt through
the late 1950s. Finally, Sametz emphasized that, despite trends in internal
funds and external equity and in short-term and long-term debt, the use
of total debt financing relative to total equity financing appeared to have
remained roughly constant over long periods of time.
Friedman, confining his attention to the postwar period, pointed out
that internal funds first increased relative to total sources in the 1950s and
then decreased in the 1960s and 1970s. He also emjphasized the continued
decline in stock issues, an increased use of debt, and, in the late 1960s and
1970s, an increase in the use of short-term debt.
Looking at the whole period, as shown in the data in table 1.4, the
trends discussed by all three authors are evident, and at the same time
some longer-run trends come into sharper focus. It is clear, for example,
that the use of debt financing has increased in the 1960s and 1970s after
recovering in the years following World War II to pre-Depression levels.
Use of long-term debt, however, is by no means unusual, even after
steady postwar increases, relative to the levels prevailing in the first
decade of the century and in the 1920s. The increased use of debt, then,
seems largely attributable to an increase in short-term liabilities. It should
also be noted that short-term liabilities have shown considerable fluctua-
tions over time, with substantial increases occurring in the 1913-22
period and again during the World War II years. Although it cannot be
denied that short-term liabilities have been much higher in the postwar
period than in the prewar years, it is not clear if the recent surge repre-
sents a temporary phenomenon or the continuation of a trend. In addi-
tion, it is likely that inflationary distortions account for some portion of
the most recent increases in debt proportions generally.
On the equity side, the greatly diminished use of stock issues appears to
be a long-term trend. Stock issues staged a modest comeback in the
1970s, compared with the 1960s, but they remain very low by prewar
standards. Furthermore, much of the increase in the 1970s is accounted
for by public utility preferred stock issuance (Friedman 1980). Because28 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
utilities are required to meet the demand for service, their investment
and financing decisions reflect special factors that may not be present in
the decisions of other nonfinancial corporations. As has been widely
noted, internally generated funds have also declined relative to total
sources during the postwar period. The data indicate, however, that the
depressed levels of internal funds experienced in the 1970s are not
unusually low relative to the levels of the first decade of the century and
the 1920s. It might be inferred, instead, that the use of internal funds was
unusually high during the period 1930-60 and that the past two decades
have witnessed a return to roughly the levels experienced during the
pre-Depression era.
1.1.5 Common Trends
Viewing the different measures of corporate financing patterns simul-
taneously, some common threads appear. First, the use of debt financing
has increased considerably in the postwar period. Despite the presence of
inflationary distortions in some of the data, this trend emerges regardless
of the method of measurement employed. There is considerably more
doubt, however, as to whether current debt levels are unusally high
relative to those of the prewar period. The accounting-based data of
tables 1.1 and 1.4 suggest that they are, but the measures that make some
attempt to correct for valuation changes, as shown in tables 1.2 and 1.3,
indicate that this may not be true. At the very least, the trend in corporate
debt ratios has not been unidirectional. Rather, these ratios appear to
have been somewhat low in the 1920s and especially in the years sur-
rounding World War II. Thus, the postwar surge in corporate debt does
not appear to be as dramatic when viewed in the light of the whole
century's experience as it does when the postwar period is considered in
isolation.
Second, some changes have occurred within the debt and equity
components of corporate finance. Although it is traceable only in the
sources- and uses-of-funds data, there appears to be little doubt that
short-term liabilities have increased in importance over time. Again,
however, the trend is not unidirectional. Within the equity component,
there is no doubt that issues of both preferred and common stock have
declined considerably in relative importance. Internally generated
equity, on the other hand, is currently low relative to the previous few
decades, but whether it is unusually low when a longer-run view is taken
is far less clear.
1.2 Implications of Existing Theory for the Determinants
of the Aggregate Corporate Capital Structure
Before the trends observed in the preceding section can be interpreted,
a theory is needed to predict the causal factors underlying them. Existing29 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
capital structure theories are capable of identifying a number of such
factors, although this has not been recognized as explicitly as it might be.
In this section, the major capital structure theories are reviewed with an
eye toward drawing out more explicitly the determinants of aggregate
financing trends.
To facilitate this process, some of the theories will be recast in terms of
their implications for the aggregate supply and demand for corporate
securities. This analysis of aggregate supply and demand is carried out in
section 1.2.1, while the determinants of aggregate capital structure trends
are discussed in section 1.2.2. In the diagrams accompanying the text, the
aggregate amount of corporate debt, B, will be measured along the
horizontal axis, and since investment will be held fixed, movements along
this axis represent substitutions of corporate debt for equity. On the
vertical axis will be measured the certainty-equivalent yields on corporate
debt, r, and on corporate equity, re.
In keeping with most previous literature, corporate capital structure
will be taken to represent the mix of debt and common equity financing.
The framework employed is more general than that, however, and could
also be used to include preferred stock and a variety of other hybrid
financing instruments.
1.2.1 A Brief Review of Existing Capital Structure Theories
Modigliani and Miller's (1958) analysis of corporate capital structure is
the logical place to begin, both because it remains the classic paper on the
topic and because it is a special case of most subsequent theories. In the
context of a "complete" capital market, the Modigliani-Miller theorem
implies that the aggregate supply and demand for corporate debt coincide
and that both are perfectly elastic, as depicted in figure 1.4. Supply is
perfectly elastic because corporations can costlessly transform their
financing mixes from all equity to any degree of leverage. Thus they are
willing to freely substitute one form of financing for the other as long as
S,D
Fig. 1.4 Supply, 5, and demand, D, for corporate debt implied by
Modigliani and Miller (1958).30 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
both have the same certainty-equivalent cost. But demand is likewise
perfectly elastic because households can costlessly perform the same
transformations on their own account, and thus they will be unwilling to
accept any yield differential between the two securities.
1
3
This configuration of supply and demand implies that corporate capital
structure is indeterminate not only at the individual firm level but also at
the level of the corporate sector as a whole, since corporate and house-
hold financial transformation are perfectly substitutable.
1
4 While this
analysis emphasizes the important fact that corporations face competi-
tion from other sectors in their financial transformation activities, how-
ever, it also does not tell us much about factors that would cause the
aggregate corporate financing mix to change over time. As long as
equilibrium in the capital market is continuously maintained, such
changes are largely random events.
Following Modigliani and Miller's (1963) correction for corporate
taxes, a theory that gained considerable support took the trade-off be-
tween bankruptcy costs and tax savings from the deductibility of interest
to be the primary determinant of corporate capital structure.
1
5 Under this
theory the demand for corporate debt is still perfectly elastic, because
investors are willing to substitute debt for equity freely as long as their
certainty-equivalent yields are equal.
1
6 The supply of debt is no longer
perfectly elastic, however. Because of the tax deductibility of interest,
corporations would be willing to pay a certainty-equivalent yield on the
first dollar of debt equal to (1/1 — tc) times the certainty-equivalent yield
on equity, where tc is the corporate tax rate. As more debt is issued, the
probability of bankruptcy increases, and if bankruptcy imposes costs on
firms, the premium rate that they are willing to pay to issue debt de-
creases. Thus the supply curve for corporate debt is downward sloping, as
depicted in figure 1.5. Equilibrium is reached when the corporate sector
has issued an amount of total debt that drives the certainty-equivalent
yields on debt and equity into equality. Furthermore, since bankruptcy
costs are firm specific, the optimal capital structure is determinate at the
individual firm level as well as at the aggregate level. The aggregate
supply curve for corporate debt may be thought of as a horizontal sum of
individual firm supply curves, and the optimal capital structure for any
firm is determined by the point at which re cuts its individual debt supply
curve. As will be seen in section 1.2.2, the primary determinants of
changing patterns in the aggregate corporate financial structure are
changes in corporate tax rates and changing perceptions of bankruptcy
costs.
The agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is diagrammatically
similar to the tax savings-bankruptcy costs theory, but some of its im-
plications are different. Again, the demand curve for corporate debt is
perfectly elastic at the level re. Likewise the supply curve has its intercept31 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
Fig. 1.5 Supply and demand for corporate debt implied by the tax-
saving-bankruptcy costs theory.
at a point above re, because, starting from all-equity financing, the firm
can reduce total agency costs associated with outside financing by substi-
tuting a dollar of debt for a dollar of outside equity. Thus the firm would
be willing to pay a higher certainty-equivalent yield on debt to reflect this
advantage. As more debt is issued, however, its ability to reduce agency
costs at the margin declines and eventually turns negative, so the supply
curve is downward sloping as depicted in figure 1.6.
1
7 As with the previous
theory, the costs that cause this downward slope are firm specific, so
equilibrium determines an optimal capital structure at the individual firm
as well as at the aggregate level.
The difference between this theory and the previous one is that in the
agency theory, the supply curve's vertical intercept lies above re even in
the absence of taxes. In the tax savings-bankruptcy costs model, elimi-
nating taxes would shift the intercept of the debt supply curve down to re.
Under the agency cost theory, by contrast, the possibility of economizing
on agency costs makes the firm willing to offer a premium rate on the first
dollar of debt, even if it could realize no tax saving. Without specific
knowledge of the nature of the agency costs, however, the vertical
intercept of the debt supply curve cannot be identified as precisely in
figure 1.6 as it can in figure 1.5.
Shifts in the relative agency costs of debt and equity would be the
primary determinants under this theory of changing patterns in the
aggregate corporate financial structure. In addition, there is an interac-
tion in the agency cost theory between financing and investment. Certain
types of assets may be more amenable than others to reducing the agency
costs associated with either form of financing. Some types of assets may32 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
lfi/1-tr
Fig. 1.6 Supply and demand curves for corporate debt implied by the
agency cost theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
be more suitable for use as collateral, for example, and may facilitate the
use of more debt. In the aggregate, then, changes in the characteristics of
the corporate sector's capital stock may also influence changes in the
aggregate financing mix.
As an aside, it might be mentioned that the Ross (1977) signaling
model can be viewed for our purposes as very similar to the agency cost
model. Corporate capital structures are determined by a combination of
information and managerial incentive problems in the Ross model, and
these would lead to a similar downward-sloping debt supply curve. For
each firm in Ross's model, there is some amount of debt that maximizes
its perceived value, subject to the equilibrium condition that investors'
perceptions be correct. Because of the way their incentive compensation
scheme is set up, the firm's managers would be willing to pay a premium
yield to substitute debt for equity up to this optimal point, but a negative
premium beyond that point. The signaling model is thus diagrammati-
cally identical to the agency cost model. As in the agency cost model,
asset characteristics would play an important role in secular financing
patterns, since firms' optimal capital structures depend on the range of
asset qualities across firms and on investors' ability to distinguish among
them.
The only theory explicitly aimed at the capital structure of the corpo-
rate sector as a whole is Miller's (1977) "debt and taxes" model. Here,
the supply curve is horizontal since, apart from tax considerations, cor-
porations can costlessly split their return streams into debt and equity
portions. Furthermore, because of the tax deductibility of interest they
are willing to pay a premium yield, rel\ - tc, to issue debt. Unlike the33 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
three theories discussed above, however, personal taxes are considered,
and the demand curve is upward sloping, starting from re.
ls This is because
investors are arrayed in groups subject to successively higher personal tax
rates and because tax arbitrage restrictions make it costly for them to
mitigate the differing tax consequences of different securities. Thus, since
returns on corporate debt are taxed more heavily at the personal level
than returns on corporate equity, investors in successively higher tax
brackets must be enticed with successively higher yields to buy these
bonds. As depicted in figure 1.7, equilibrium occurs when enough bonds
have been issued to drive the corporate bond rate up to rel\ - tc.
In contrast to the tax savings-bankruptcy costs theory and the agency
cost theory, however, corporate capital structure is determinate only at
the aggregate level, not at the individual firm level. As in the original
Modigliani-Miller model, corporations and households compete with one
another to perform financial transformations, but here they do not all
compete on equal terms. Corporations that issue debt reap tax savings at
the rate tc per dollar of interest, and thus they have a comparative
advantage in borrowing over those investors with personal tax rates lower
than tc. It will thus pay corporations to keep on borrowing until the
marginal shareholder is just indifferent between buying levered shares
and borrowing on his own account to buy unlevered shares. This will
occur when the marginal shareholder's tax rate is just equal to tc. Never-
theless, this comparative advantage applies to the corporate sector as a
whole, but not to any individual firm. One corporation's debt is as good as
any other's, and thus, in equilibrium, capital structure is of no conse-
quence at the firm level.
Fig. 1.7 Supply and demand for corporate debt implied by Miller
(1977).34 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
Determinants of changes in the aggregate capital structure in Miller's
model include corporate and personal tax rates and the relative supplies
of taxable and tax-exempt securities. The specific effects of these factors
will be brought out in more detail in section 1.2.2.
The four theories reviewed above are primarily distinguished, then, by
their implications for the shapes and positions of the aggregate supply
and demand curves for corporate debt. A salient characteristic of these
theories is that all of them imply perfect elasticity for the demand curve,
the supply curve, or both. It should also be noted that the theories are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible to combine corporate taxes
with the agency cost model, for example, resulting in a diagram that looks
qualitatively similar but has the debt supply curve shifted upward to
reflect its tax advantage.
1
9 Similarly, agency or bankruptcy costs could be




We now turn to a comparative statics analysis of the effects of various
factors, such as tax rates and security supplies, on the equilibrium finan-
cial structure in these models. Since there is no equilibrium financial
structure in the original Modigliani-Miller model, the discussion will
center largely on the other three models.
1.2.2 Determinants of Secular Trends in Corporate Finance
Tax Factors. A prominent factor affecting the equilibrium financial struc-
ture in both the tax savings-bankruptcy costs and Miller models is the
corporate tax rate. An increase in the corporate tax rate in the tax
savings-bankruptcy costs model simply shifts the debt supply curve up-
ward. Investors would still be willing to freely substitute debt for equity
securities as long as their certainty-equivalent yields were equal, how-
ever, and thus, abstracting from any wealth effects that might change the
absolute level of security yields, the demand curve for corporate debt
would be unaffected.
2
1 The net result of the increased corporate tax rate,
therefore, would be an increased amount of corporate debt relative to
equity.
In the Miller model, the effect of an increase in the corporate tax rate is
somewhat less straightforward. Recalling that the certainty-equivalent
return on equity in Miller's model is equal to the tax-exempt bond yield,
r0, the equilibrium condition can be written as
(i) i-f(i-o = o.
This condition can in turn be thought of as an implicit function, H(B*,f)
= 0, of the optimal amount of corporate debt, B*, and a vector of
exogenous factors, /, such as tax rates. The effect of an increase in tc,35 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations








The denominator is negative, since an increase in B increases the supply
of taxable relative to tax-exempt securities and thus increases r relative to
r0. The whole expression will thus be positive, and an increase in corpo-
rate tax rates will increase the equilibrium amount of corporate debt, if
the numerator is positive. An increase in tc, holding all security supplies
constant, decreases the availability of tax-exempt income from shares,
and this will induce high tax bracket investors to bid down r0 relative to r.
The sign of the numerator in (2), therefore, depends on the relative
magnitudes of the two terms. It is argued in Appendix A, however, that
the net effect of tc on B* will be positive unless the adjustment in relative
interest rates to tc, the second term in the numerator, is unreasonably
large. This exercise is represented diagrammatically in figure 1.8. The
increase in the corporate tax rate from tc to t'c shifts the supply curve
upward. The effect of tc on the relative yields, r/r0, however, also causes
the demand curve to rotate upward. Comparing this case with the effect
of increased corporate taxes in the tax savings-bankruptcy costs model,












Change in equilibrium quantity of corporate debt caused by an
increase in the corporate tax rate.36 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
the demand curve in Miller's model, as well as its upward rotation
resulting from the increase in tc, though, makes the net increase in
corporate debt smaller in Miller's model than in the tax savings-bank-
ruptcy costs model.
Another tax factor that can affect equilibrium corporate leverage is the
set of personal tax rates, tp. These rates play no role in either the tax
savings-bankruptcy costs or agency costs models, but in Miller's model
they are an important determinant of the corporate sector's comparative
advantage in borrowing over different segments of the investing public. If
an increase in the corporate tax rate is accompanied by an increase in
personal tax rates, for example, analysis similar to that carried out in the








Since increases in tp increase the value of tax-exempt income to investors,
r/r0 would be expected to increase with tp and hence any increase in B*
would be smaller than in the previous case where only tc increased. It is
possible, of course, that B* may even decline.
2
2
Diagrammatically, this exercise is similar to that shown in figure 1.8.
The only difference is that the demand curve rotates upward by an even
greater amount, thus dampening further or even offsetting any upward
pressure on corporate debt caused by the upward shift in the supply
curve.
The models' predictions about the effects of extreme changes in tax
rates can also be examined. If all tax rates are driven to zero, for example,
the supply curve in the tax savings-bankruptcy costs model shifts down-
ward until its vertical intercept is at re. Since the demand curve is un-
changed, this implies that equilibrium corporate leverage goes to zero. In
the Miller model, by contrast, elimination of all taxes shifts the supply
curve down to re (= r0) and flattens out the demand curve at the same
level since taxable and tax-exempt securities are now perfect substitutes.
This reduces, then, to the original Modigliani-Miller model and equilib-
rium corporate leverage is indeterminate.
An Aside on Taxes and Preferred Stock. Similar analysis can be applied to
different types of securities, such as preferred stock. The supply curve for
preferred stock in the Miller model would be horizontal at the level re.37 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
That is, preferred stock and common equity receive the same tax treat-
ment at the corporate level, and thus corporations would regard them as
perfect substitutes at the same certainty-equivalent yield. If we ignore
any inflexibilities from the cumulation of omitted dividends, preferred
stocks entails no bankruptcy costs, and thus the supply curve would also
be horizontal at re in the tax savings-bankruptcy costs model. The de-
mand curve in both models would be horizontal in the absence of taxes.
The imposition of personal taxes would make this demand curve slope
upward in Miller's model.
2
3
If we start from a no-tax situation and then impose both corporate and
personal taxes with no tax deductibility of preferred stock dividends, the
Miller model offers no prediction of what would happen to the amount of
preferred stock outstanding. This amount was indeterminate in the ab-
sence of taxes and some preferred stock could still be issued to tax-ex-
empt investors and corporations at a yield of re in the presence of taxes.
Thus, the model does not predict preferred stock's disappearance or
even, necessarily, its decline. The tax savings-bankruptcy costs model
does not even have the upward slope in demand and hence it likewise
offers no firm prediction about the equilibrium amount of preferred stock
when taxes are imposed.
If the Miller model is combined with the agency costs model, a deter-
minate amount of preferred stock could exist, even in the absence of
taxes, because of its agency cost-reducing properties. That is, corpora-
tions might be willing to pay a premium yield to issue some amount of
preferred stock, whereas investors would demand no premium. The
supply curve will also slope downward because additional issues of pre-
ferred stock would create agency problems of their own, similar to those
posed by debt. If taxes are then imposed, the demand curve will bend
upward, leaving the supply curve unchanged, and the equilibrium quan-
tity of preferred stock will thus be reduced. This effect is illustrated in
figure 1.9.
Inflation. Inflation is often mentioned in popular discussions as a determi-
nant of corporate financing trends. While financial economists would
reject the notion that debt financing is advantageous under inflation
because it can be repaid in "cheaper dollars," there is, nevertheless,
some basis in capital structure theory for an inflation-induced effect on
aggregate financing patterns. This effect generally stems from the interac-
tion between inflation and tax factors.
In the tax savings-bankruptcy costs model, for example, an increase in
anticipated inflation will increase all interest rates by (approximately) the
increase in the expected inflation rate. Looking at figure 1.5, and letting
Ai denote the increase in expected inflation, the demand curve for corpo-
rate debt will shift upward by A/. The supply curve, on the other hand,38 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
D' (with taxes)
D(no taxes)
Fig. 1.9 Effect on equilibrium amount of preferred stock from impos-
ing taxes (Miller model with agency costs).
shifts up by A//1 - tc. Since the supply curve shifts up by more than the
demand curve, the equilibrium amount of corporate debt must increase,
and this can be interpreted as occurring because inflation increases the
real value of the interest tax deduction on debt.
In the Miller model, by contrast, the inflation premium in interest rates
is taxed at the personal level and this has offsetting effects. An increase in
expected inflation of A/, for example, will increase the tax-exempt bond
rate demanded by investors by approximately A/. Investors in taxable
securities, however, will demand that nominal rates rise sufficiently to
maintain real after-tax yields. This implies that for the marginal investor,
whose personal tax rate is tpm, the taxable bond rate must rise by approx-
imately MI{1 - tpm).
24
The change in equilibrium corporate debt resulting from a change in




The numerator may, in turn, be expressed as
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But, letting drldi = 1/(1 - tpm) and dro/di = 1 and recognizing that in
equilibrium the marginal investor will be just indifferent between taxable
and tax-exempt bonds, this numerator reduces to zero.
Diagrammatically, as shown in figure 1.10, the increase in expected
inflation shifts the supply curve for debt up ward by Ar0 /(I - tc) = Ai/(1 -
tc). The demand curve, however, shifts upward by different amounts for
investors in different tax brackets. At the intercept, which corresponds to
the demand for taxable bonds by tax-exempt investors, the demand curve
shifts upward by Ar0 = A/. At other points, corresponding to the demand
for bonds by investors in tax bracket/, the demand curve will shift upward
by A//(l - tpJ). In particular, in the initial equilibrium an amount, B*, of
corporate debt had been issued such that the personal tax bracket, tpm, of
the marginal bondholder was equal to the corporate tax bracket, tc. At B*,
then, the increase in expected inflation causes the demand curve to shift
upward by A//(l — tc), which is exactly the same amount by which the
supply curve shifts upward. The new supply and demand curves, S' and




This result is altered, however, when Miller's model is combined with
the agency cost model. As depicted in figure 1.11, agency costs impart a
downward slope to the debt supply curve, and the initial equilibrium
occurs at B*. As long as agency costs cause equilibrium debt to be less
than it would be if supply were perfectly elastic (that is, as long as B* is
less than B* in fig. 1.10), the personal tax bracket, tpm, of the marginal
bondholder at B* will be less than the corporate tax rate.
Fig. 1.10 Effect of an increase in expected inflation in Miller model with






Fig. 1.11 Effect of an increase in expected inflation in Miller model with
agency costs.
When an increase in expected inflation occurs, the supply curve in
figure 1.11 shifts up by bdl{\ - tc) assuming that inflation is neutral with
respect to the agency cost function. At B*, however, the demand curve
shifts up by A//(l - tpm) < A//(l - Q, and, given the slopes of the two
curves, the new intersection point must occur to the right of B*. Hence, in
the presence of agency costs, an increase in expected inflation encourages
substitution of debt for equity financing and increases equilibrium corpo-
rate leverage.
2
6 This result emerges, however, not from some "debtor-
creditor" hypothesis, as has sometimes been argued, but from inflation's
interaction with the tax system and agency costs.
2
7
Supplies of Competing Securities. A special feature of Miller's model is its
prediction that exogenous changes in the supplies of other securities will
induce changes in corporate leverage. An increase in the supply of




\r0) Since an increase in Bo increases r0 relative to r, expression (6) will be
positive. From a personal tax standpoint, tax-exempt bonds are substi-
tutes for equity in Miller's model, and thus an increase in the supply of tax41 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
exempts encourages corporations to shift their financing mix more to-
ward debt. Graphically, the increase in the supply of tax exempts results
in a downward rotation of the demand curve for corporate debt. Since
there are now more tax-exempt bonds, the marginal investor at any given
level of corporate debt will be in a lower personal tax bracket than was
previously the case. Hence, the equilibrium amount of corporate debt
increases.
An increase in the supply of competing taxable bonds, on the other
hand, has the opposite effect on B*. If the supply of federal government
bonds, G, increases, for example, the effect on corporate debt is given by
(7) dB*
dG
Since the increase in G must increase r relative to r0, expression (7) is
negative. From a personal tax standpoint, taxable government bonds are
a substitute for corporate debt, and an increase in the supply of debt
substitutes induces corporations to shift their financing mix more toward
equity. Graphically, the demand curve for corporate debt rotates up-
ward, and this results in a decrease in equilibrium corporate debt. It
should also be pointed out that an increase in the supply of any other type
of taxable debt instrument, such as mortgages, would have the same
effect on the corporate financing mix.
2
8
In sharp contrast to Miller's model, exogenous changes in security
supplies would have no effect on relative yields in any of the other capital
structure models. The perfectly elastic demand curves in each of the
other models imply that investors are willing to freely substitute one type
of security for another in their portfolios, as long as the certainty-
equivalent yields on these securities are equal. Any changes in portfolio
risk resulting from such substitutions can be offset costlessly because
investors can create perfect substitutes for corporate (or any other)
securities, either on their own account or through financial intermediaries
acting on their behalf. In such an environment, then, changes in relative
security supplies will have no effect on relative yields and hence no effect
on the optimal corporate financing mix.
In the Modigliani-Miller world, it is true in a general equilibrium sense
that an increase in the supply of substitutes for corporate debt might
result in a decrease in the amount of corporate debt outstanding. In
equilibrium, the supply of some debt security (e.g., personal debt, finan-
cial intermediary debt, corporate debt) must fall in order to make room
for any increased amount of substitute securities, and the one that falls
could just as well be corporate debt as any other. But since it could also
just as well be some other security, the Modigliani-Miller model offers no42 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
strong prediction of a decline in corporate debt. In the agency costs or tax
savings-bankruptcy costs models, moreover, the downward-sloping
supply curve determines the equilibrium amount of corporate debt, and if
both relative yields and the position of the supply curve are unchanged,
corporate debt is unchanged. Hence these models offer a strong predic-
tion that corporate debt will not change in response to competing security
supplies.
Miller's model, on the other hand, is the only one of the capital
structure models that has an imperfectly elastic demand curve for corpo-
rate debt. Because of tax arbitrage restrictions (or at least the costly
nature of tax arbitrage), investors are unable to create perfect substitutes
for securities with different tax treatment. Such securities are imperfect
substitutes, therefore, and the terms on which investors are willing to
substitute one type of security for another differ across investors in
different tax brackets. In such an environment, changes in the relative
supplies of different types of securities will cause changes in relative
yields and these will, in turn, induce changes in the corporate financing
mix.
Agency Costs and the Characteristics of Corporate Investment. A final
determinant of aggregate corporate financing patterns that can be drawn
from existing capital structure theories is the costs associated with corpo-
rate debt. These include bankruptcy costs or, more generally, agency
costs of all kinds. It is clear from figures 1.5 and 1.6, for instance, that
increases (decreases) in the magnitude of these costs will tilt the debt
supply curve more (less) sharply downward and thus decrease (increase)
the equilibrium amount of corporate debt. Moreover, the important
aspect of these costs is corporate managers' and investors' perceptions of
their magnitude. If the risk of bankruptcy is perceived to increase be-
cause it is felt that the economy generally has become less stable, this will
induce corporations to reduce their leverage.
It should also be noted that the costs associated with debt create an
interaction between financing and investment. Even if the functional
relationship among assets, financing sources, and agency costs does not
change, a change in asset characteristics can alter the optimal financing
mix. If the corporate sector's investment shifts more toward assets that
are less risky, that are more easily used as collateral, or that lend them-
selves more readily to perquisite consumption by owner-managers, the
aggregate corporate financing mix will shift away from outside equity and
more toward debt. In addition, as suggested by Myers's (1977) analysis,
the relationship between future investment opportunities and assets in
place will also influence the corporate financing mix. The greater these
future opportunities are, the more debt financing will exacerbate the43 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
problem of potential underinvestment and hence the less heavily debt will
be used.
This influence that asset characteristics and other factors specific to
individual firms have on the financing mix is a unique feature of the
capital structure models that exhibit downward-sloping debt supply
curves. In the Modigliani-Miller and Miller (without agency costs) mod-
els, this supply curve is perfectly elastic and hence firms are willing to
substitute debt and equity financing indefinitely on the same terms. Asset
characteristics are incapable of altering this terms of trade, and no firm is
unique in the terms it is willing to offer to substitute one form of financing
for another. Hence, firm-specific factors play no role in capital structure
determination.
Summary. The results of the comparative statics exercises in this section
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two purposes. First, they are intended to identify those causal factors that
capital structure theory suggests might be useful in explaining corporate
financing patterns. The left-hand column of table 1.5 provides a list of
such factors. Second, table 1.5 lists a set of predictions that can be used to
test the different capital structure theories. A finding that changes in
expected inflation are systematically associated with changes in corporate
financing, for example, would be consistent with the tax savings-bank-
ruptcy costs or Miller-cum-agency costs models, but not with the simple
versions of either the Miller or agency costs models. Similarly, the finding
of a relationship between noncorporate security supplies and the corpo-
rate financing mix would weigh in favor of one of the versions of Miller's
model, or perhaps in favor of the Modigliani-Miller model, but against
both the tax savings-bankruptcy costs and the agency costs models. It is
unfortunate, however, that none of the rows of table 1.5 contain direct
sign contradictions. It may be more difficult to distinguish empirically
between an effect and the absence of an effect than between effects in
opposite directions.
Looking at the results in table 1.5 in general terms, two additional
points emerge. The first is that the determinants of corporate financing
patterns suggested by existing capital structure theories rest heavily on
tax considerations. Apart from tax rates themselves, any effect of infla-
tion depends on its interaction with the tax system, while the effect of
noncorporate security supplies rests on the fact that the tax system
renders security demands less than perfectly elastic. The only factors
entirely unrelated to the tax system, in fact, are agency cost considera-
tions.
The second point is that the extreme assumptions made by most of
these models about the elasticity of either demand or supply severely
limit the range of factors that might influence corporate financing pat-
terns. As we have seen, if demand is perfectly elastic, supplies of non-
corporate securities can have no effect on the corporate financing mix. If
supply is perfectly elastic, firm-specific factors can have no effect. The
column headed "Miller with Agency Costs," the only model in which
neither demand nor supply is perfectly elastic, is the only column in table
1.5 that does not contain several "no effect" entries.
1.3 Interpretation of Capital Structure Trends
The task of this section is to link the theories described in the preceding
section with the financing trends observed in section 1.1 in an attempt to
interpret these trends. This will be done by comparing the trends in
capital structure's determinants, as outlined in table 1.5, with the capital
structure trends themselves.45 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
This attempt must be regarded as preliminary, since neither the avail-
able data nor the available theory is sufficiently rich to allow very power-
ful tests. Nevertheless, some distinctions can be made among the abilities
of different theories to explain these trends. Furthermore, it is hoped that
the empirical regularities discussed here will stimulate further refinement
of an aggregate corporate capital structure theory.
1.3.1 Corporate and Personal Tax Rates
As was seen in the preceding section, tax considerations are an impor-
tant element of capital structure determination in both the tax savings-
bankruptcy costs and Miller models. Movements in marginal corporate
and personal tax rates from 1913 to the present are shown in table 1.6.
Personal tax rates for those investors in the lowest and highest marginal
brackets are shown in columns 1 and 2, respectively, while the corporate
tax rate is shown in column 3.
The corporate tax rate has moved sharply upward, particularly in the
1940s and early 1950s. This trend is consistent, under either the tax
savings-bankruptcy costs or Miller models, with the postwar increase in
corporate leverage, although one may well ask why more of the increase
in debt did not come earlier when corporate tax rates were rising most
steeply. One might also ask why corporate leverage seems to have
decreased during at least the first decade of the tax code's existence, at
the same time that corporate tax rates increased dramatically in percent-
age terms, albeit from a small base.
Part of the answer could lie with the parallel increases in personal tax
rates, which as we saw in the subsection "Tax Factors" in section 1.2.2
could dampen the leverage effects of corporate taxes. Some additional
insight into the relationship between personal and corporate tax rates can
be gained if we think in terms of the "clientele" version of Miller's model.
In this version, low-tax-bracket investors hold shares in highly leveraged
firms while the reverse is true for high-tax-bracket investors. In effect,
low-tax-bracket investors prefer to borrow through corporations so as to
maximize the tax advantage of debt, while high-tax-bracket investors
prefer to borrow on their own account. A very rough measure of the
strength of these preferences is what Grier and Strebel (1980) have
referred to as the "net debt incentive tax ratio." This ratio, 8, is defined as
(8) 8 = i-J-ZAi,
where tc is the corporate tax rate and tpB is the personal tax rate on
ordinary income. Columns 4 and 5 of table 1.6 give time series for bL, the
debt incentive tax ratio for investors in the lowest tax bracket, and bH, the
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of the marginal return stream to investors in these tax brackets, when
firms in which they hold shares substitute an additional dollar of debt for
equity financing.
29
Ideally, of course, we would like to have a measure of the strength of
investor's demand for corporate leverage under different tax rate con-
figurations, and this would necessitate knowing the distribution of47 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
wealth, and particularly shareholdings, across the spectrum of true mar-
ginal tax rates. Without such knowledge it is perilous to infer too much
from the values of SL and bH.
30 Nevertheless, if it can reasonably be
assumed that personal tax rates between the highest and lowest values
move in concert and that the underlying wealth distribution does not shift
radically over time, movements in 8 will give at least a rough idea of the
strength of demand for corporate leverage by low-tax-bracket investors
and of the aversion to corporate leverage by high-tax-bracket investors. If
8 values tend to increase over time for both high- and low-tax-bracket
investors, for example, the demand for corporate leverage should also
increase. In addition, during times when 8 values are small, even for
low-tax-bracket investors, one would expect that any tax advantage to
corporate debt would be more easily offset by such factors as bankruptcy
and agency costs.
Turning to the values of 8 in table 1.6, the tax code apparently gave
little or no incentive for corporate leverage in the early years of its
existence. Until the early 1920s, even investors in the lowest tax brackets
had little incentive, purely from a tax standpoint, to hold shares in
levered firms, while high-tax-bracket investors often incurred a substan-
tial tax disadvantage from corporate leverage. During the 1920s this tax
disadvantage for high-tax-bracket investors grew much smaller, but at the
same time the tax advantage for low-bracket investors remained small. It
was not until the 1940s, when corporate tax rates rose dramatically, that
the 8 value grew very much for low-tax-bracket investors. From 1940 to
1954, these 8 values for low-tax-bracket investors approximately dou-
bled, whereafter they have remained essentially unchanged to the pres-
ent. Since top-bracket personal tax rates were very high in the 1940s and
1950s, the 8 values for high-bracket investors were also very negative
during this period. These 8 values have become less negative in the 1960s
and 1970s.
Overall, then, it can be inferred that the tax system should have given
rise to a demand for corporate leverage on the part of at least a segment of
the investing population. This demand should have shown particular
growth, moreover, between the 1920s and the early 1950s. In addition,
the less negative values of bH from the mid-1960s to the present may
indicate an atmosphere more conducive to corporate debt in recent years.
Comparing these trends with those discussed in section 1.1, however, it
is apparent that tax considerations cannot be the sole determinant of
patterns in corporate sector financing. Although the values of 8L were
small immediately following the advent of the income tax system, they
roughly doubled in the 1920s, again in the 1930s, and again in the 1940s.
Despite the apparent increase in the demand for corporate leverage,
however, the tables in section 1.1 indicate that corporate debt usage fell
for at least the first two decades following 1913 and that it remained low at48 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
least through World War II. The increases in both 8^ and bH that have
occurred since the 1940s are broadly consistent with increased corporate
leverage that has occurred since that period, but the two trends are not
closely synchronized.
3
1 According to tables 1.2 and 1.4, the largest in-
creases in corporate debt financing appear to have occurred during the
1970s, for example, whereas the debt tax incentive ratios have been
relatively flat during that time.
1.3.2 Inflation
Another potential explanatory factor is the inflation rate. As discussed
in the subsection "Inflation" in section 1.2.2, inflation can enhance the
real tax advantage to debt, and thus the interaction between taxes and
inflation may produce an explanation of corporate financing patterns that
is superior to that of taxes alone.
Some idea of inflation trends can be gained from the yearly percentage
changes in the implicit GNP price deflator, shown in table 1.7 for the
years 1901 to the present.
3
2 From these it might be concluded that the
relatively high inflation rates of the late 1960s and the 1970s interacted
with relatively high debt tax incentive ratios to produce an increase in
corporate debt financing during this period (although, as we have seen,
inflationary distortions in the data raise some doubts as to just how much
debt usage increased in the 1970s). There was also a temporary increase
in corporate debt usage coinciding with both the increase in debt tax
incentive ratios and the inflationary burst of the immediate post-World
War II years.
3
3 Earlier, however, the years surrounding World War I were
also years of relatively high inflation rates coupled with rising debt tax
incentive ratios (at least for investors in low tax brackets). The data in
section 1.2 indicate, though, that corporate debt financing was lower in
that decade than in the one preceding it. Again, therefore, although the
interaction between taxes and inflation may have contributed to in-
creased debt usage in recent years, it does not appear to be the sole
determinant of corporate financing patterns.
1.3.3 Supplies of Noncorporate Securities
Since the demand for corporate debt is less that perfectly elastic in the
Miller model, relative supplies of noncorporate securities can affect
corporate financing patterns. Some idea of the relative position of corpo-
rate debt in the economy may be gained from table 1.8, which shows the
total liabilities of the nonfinancial corporate, federal government, and
state and local government sectors as well as the mortgage liabilities of
the household sector, all expressed as percentages of total liabilities of
the domestic nonfinancial sectors. Data are available from Goldsmith et
al. (1963) for selected years from 1900 to 1945 and annually from 1945 to
1958. Annual data are also available from the Federal Reserve Flow of49 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations





































































































































































Source: Historical Statistics of the United States and Economic Report of the President.
Funds Accounts for the years 1945-78. The series for U.S. government
debt and household mortgage debt are intended to reflect supplies of




The data suggest that in the post-World War II years, corporate
liabilities have been much smaller relative to total liabilities than in the
pre-Depression era. There has also been little if any trend in the share of
corporate liabilities since the 1950s. While the data in tables 1.2-1.4
indicate that corporate debt financing has increased relative to equity
since that time, therefore, corporate debt has still orily kept pace with the
postwar expansion in liabilities for the economy as a whole. The share of
corporate liabilities dropped sharply during the Depression and World
War II before recovering somewhat during the years 1945-50. Since that2 u »
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time a modest upward trend seems to have occurred at least through the
mid-1970s.
Liabilities of the federal government, by contrast, were quite small at
the beginning of the century and remained so until the Depression, even
including the increase surrounding World War I. During the Depression
and especially during World War II, however, federal government debt
mushroomed relative to that of the other sectors of the economy. There-
after, it declined steadily before reaching an apparent plateau in the
1970s.
On the whole, state and local government and household mortgage
liabilities have been smaller than those of the corporate and federal
government sectors. State and local government debt has remained rel-
atively small throughout, with little apparent trend. Household mortgage
debt hovered around 15% of total liabilities in the pre-Depression era,
before falling somewhat by the end of World War II. Since then it has
increased to a plateau of about 20%, beginning in the 1960s.
If we focus on the relationship between corporate debt and federal
government debt, the prediction that corporate debt responds inversely
to supplies of close substitute securities appears to receive some support
from the data in table 1.8. A similar relationship has also been noted by
Friedman (1982). Particularly in the first half of this century, the share of
corporate liabilities has tended to move in the opposite direction from
that of federal government liabilities. At the same time that federal
government debt was taking its great upward leap during the Depression
and World War II, for example, the share of corporate liabilities declined
dramatically, as did the share of debt in total corporate financing. Simi-
larly, corporate debt financing has generally increased relative to equity
during the postwar years at the same time that the share of federal
government liabilities has fallen.
At other points, however, the predictions from Miller's model and the
data in table 1.8 do not seem to coincide exactly. Little can be inferred,
for example, about the relationship between corporate financing patterns
and movements in state and local government liabilities or household
mortgage liabilities. If anything, the share of corporate liabilities seems to
have moved in the same direction as that of household mortgages.
3
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Moreover, corporate leverage, as measured by tables 1.2 and 1.4 at least,
shows large increases in the 1970s when the relative supply of government
securities is essentially flat.
1.3.4 Perceived Costs Associated with Corporate Debt
A final determinant of corporate financing trends that is suggested by
existing capital structure theory is shifts in the perceived magnitude of
bankruptcy and agency costs. The greater these costs are perceived to be,
the smaller will be the share of debt in total corporate financing. Unfortu-53 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
nately, while the theory's prediction is straightforward, these costs are
impossible to measure with any precision.
One factor related to agency costs that can be measured at least
roughly is the relationship between corporations' future investment
opportunities and their assets in place. As was seen in the subsection
"Agency Costs and the Characteristics of Corporate Investment" in
section 1.2.2, Myers (1977) has argued that the availability of future
investment opportunities exacerbates the moral hazard problem between
current bondholders and shareholders and weighs against the use of debt
financing for existing assets.
Since future investment opportunities are theoretically reflected in the
market value of firms' securities, movements in Tobin's q, or the ratio of
the market value of firms' assets to their reproduction cost, provide a
rough measure of the changing relationship between these future oppor-
tunities and existing assets. It is true that a marginal, rather than an
average, q is the best measure of the prospective profitability of a firm's
next dollar of investment. But in long-run competitive equilibrium, firms
will have adjusted their investment until both marginal and average q
values are equal to unity. Changes in average q values provide signals for
this adjustment process by indicating changes in the perceived profitabil-
ity of future investment.
3
6
Estimates of q covering the period 1929-80 for U.S. nonfinancial
corporations as a whole are shown in table 1.9. The agency cost theory
would predict that q and corporate debt usage should move inversely, but
comparing the data in table 1.9 with those in tables 1.1-1.3, the evidence
in favor of this prediction is somewhat mixed. Through World War II, the
market value debt ratios generally moved inversely with the q values in
table 1.9.
3
7 Similarly, the Goldsmith data in table 1.3 suggest that debt
ratios rose during the early years of the Depression as q was falling and
then fell in the later years of the Depression as q was rising. Both the
Holland and Myers and the Goldsmith data indicate sharply lower debt
ratios by the end of World War II than had prevailed during the 1930s,
however, and it is less clear if this can be explained by any consistent
increases in q values around this time. In the postwar years, the early
increase in corporate debt is consistent with the depressed q values
prevailing during the 1950s. Debt usage should then have fallen in the
1960s, though, when q values soared, but there is no evidence that it did
so. Similarly, although increased debt in the early 1970s is consistent with
lower q values, debt usage should have continued to rise in the mid-1970s
as q values fell further, but it seems instead to have fallen.
This facet of the agency cost theory, then, seems to show a modest
degree of explanatory power in interpreting capital structure trends. In
fairness to the theory, it should be kept in mind that its predictions have
been made at the individual firm level, and aggregation problems may54 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
Table 1.9 Estimates of q (Ratio of Market Value of U.S. Nonfinancial
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Table 1.9 (continued)
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Another factor related to agency and bankruptcy costs that can be
measured at least roughly is the general stability of business, or "business
risk." The less stable are economic conditions, the greater is the overall
chance of business failures and the greater will be the weight of bank-
ruptcy costs on corporate financing decisions. Similarly, as the chance of
bankruptcy increases, the agency problems associated with debt are
exacerbated. As business conditions become less stable, therefore,
corporate leverage should fall.
A possible measure of perceived stability is the standard deviation of
stock price changes or stock market returns. These measures, derived
from monthly changes in the Standard and Poor's Composite Index, are
shown in table 1.10 for the years 1890-1981. A crude measure of the
standard deviation of returns on total assets, which is perhaps a better
indicator of business, as opposed to financial, risk is also shown in column
3 of table 1.10.
3
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On the basis of these figures, it might be plausible to argue that
increased tax incentives for corporate debt in the late 1930s and early
1940s were overwhelmed by greater perceived instability in the wake of
the Depression. One could similarly make a case, as Gordon and Malkiel
(1981) do, that increased instability since 1974 has contributed to a
decline, or at least a leveling off, of corporate leverage since that time.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to isolate any general trends in the data in
table 1.10. The increased instability surrounding the Depression does not
seem to have been inordinately long-lived, for example, relative to the
apparent inertia in the recovery of corporate debt ratios. Moreover, the
decline in corporate leverage between 1912 and 1929 does not seem to
coincide with any general increase in economic instability. Overall, then,
the data again appear to grant some explanatory power to agency and
bankruptcy cost notions, but these factors do not seem capable of stand-
ing alone as determinants of corporate financing trends.
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changing industry composition of the corporate sector. Jensen and Meek-
ling (1976) suggest, for example, that firms in different industries will
have different optimal capital structures because they face agency prob-
lems of varying magnitudes. As industries rise and fall in relative impor-
tance, then, the aggregate corporate capital structure could change even
if agency cost functions remain perfectly stable. Interpretation of such
trends, however, requires a better understanding of industry effects on
capital structure than is currently available from existing theory. Thus
this avenue of inquiry will not be pursued further here.
1.3.5 The Ability of Existing Theory to Explain Aggregate
Patterns in Corporate Finance
Taking the results of this section as a whole, we can distinguish the
relative abilities of existing theories to explain the data. The primary
conclusion is that the simplest capital structure models, based on one or
two explanatory factors, do not seem fully consistent with the data. To
the extent that the analysis in this section has favored any of the models in
table 1.5, then, it is the Miller model with agency costs.
4
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Despite the caveats noted in section 1.3.1, for example, this model is
broadly consistent with the parallel trends in debt ratios and tax factors,
particularly in the post-World War II years. In addition, the model is
consistent with the parallel increases in inflation and debt usage of the
late 1960s and 1970s. To the extent that the interaction between inflation
and the tax system is important, this may explain why, by market value
measures at least, much of the postwar increase in debt ratios did not
occur until this time, even though corporate tax rates and debt tax
incentive ratios increased earlier. Moreover, a relationship between in-
flation and debt ratios would weigh against the simpler version of the
Miller model, since that version predicts no such relationship.
It might be argued that the tax savings-bankruptcy costs model is also
consistent with these trends. Several other factors, however, would favor
the Miller model with agency costs over the tax savings-bankruptcy costs
model. The initial existence and then secular decline of preferred stock
financing, for instance, cannot be explained by the latter model, whereas
it can by the former. The simple version of the Miller model would also
have difficulty explaining this phenomenon. An additional factor favor-
ing the Miller model with agency costs over the tax savings-bankruptcy
costs model is the apparent inverse relationship between federal govern-
ment debt and corporate debt. At the same time, such a relationship
would weigh against the pure agency cost model. Finally, to the extent
that there is at least some relationship between debt ratios and future
investment opportunities, this would tend to favor a capital structure
model with an agency cost component.59 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
One potential cloud hangs over the Miller model with agency costs,
however, and that is its behavior in the complete absence of taxes. In that
case the model simply reverts to the pure agency cost model. It is entirely
possible that agency cost considerations alone can account for corporate
financing trends prior to the imposition of the U.S. tax code in 1913, or in
the years immediately following that when tax considerations may not
have been very important. Looking at tables 1.3 and 1.4, though, it is
difficult to pinpoint agency cost factors that would explain the decreases
in corporate debt usage surrounding that time. As pointed out in section
1.3.4, for example, there is no apparent trend toward greater economic
instability during this period. In addition, table 1.8 suggests that the
inverse relationship between corporate and federal government debt may
have existed even in the early years before tax factors had a very strong
limiting influence on the substitutability among different types of secu-
rities. The pure agency cost model would be unable to explain such an
inverse relationship.
There are some grounds for suspecting, therefore, that even the Miller
model with agency costs does not provide an entirely satisfying explana-
tion for the secular patterns in corporate finance. In the next section,
some suggestions are offered for augmenting the theory so as to enhance
its explanatory power.
1.4 Some Suggestions for an Augmented Theory of the
Aggregate Corporate Capital Structure
As was seen in the subsection "Supplies of Competing Securities" of
section 1.2.2, the demand curve for corporate debt distinguishes Miller's
model from other existing capital structure theories. In all of the compet-
ing theories, this demand curve is perfectly elastic.
In general, perfect elasticity on the demand side indicates a well-devel-
oped capital market, that is, one in which trading is competitive, transac-
tion costs are low, investors are not subject to trading restrictions, and a
full range of securities is available.
4
1 In such an environment, changes in
relative security supplies need not change relative prices because inves-
tors can engage in costless portfolio transactions that will completely
offset any effects of the change in security supplies. If the corporate
sector substitutes debt for equity financing, for example, investors hold-
ing equity would then have riskier portfolios on the average because of
the increased corporate leverage. This change could be completely offset,
however, if investors simply reduced their personal borrowing by an
equivalent amount, and thus the increased corporate debt could be
absorbed without any change in the relative prices of debt and equity
securities.60 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
While the vision of a well-developed capital market that has pervaded
modern finance theory has proved to be a highly useful abstraction, it
may be more appropriate for analyzing snapshots of equilibrium than for
examining longer historical eras. The primary suggestion offered in this
section, therefore, is that a better understanding of corporate financing
trends over such eras requires a broader understanding of the corporate
sector's evolving role in the development of the financial system. Over
long periods, economic forces work toward making the capital market
more perfect and more complete. Such forces will shape the corporate
sector's financing choices, but at the same time corporate financing
patterns themselves can serve as a force in the development process.
4
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1.4.1 The Place of the Corporate Sector in the
Overall Financial System
Suppose we step back to get a broader perspective on the place of the
corporate sector's financial structure in the context of the financial system
generally. In order to reconcile the desires of its ultimate wealthholders
(households) with the characteristics of its ultimate wealth (tangible
assets), the economy develops a financial structure, consisting of non-
financial corporations, securities markets, and financial institutions. Cor-
porations specialize in holding and managing tangible assets and issue
debt and equity claims against them. Financial institutions hold some of
these corporate securities and in turn issue their own claims with different
liquidity characteristics and patterns of return. Some of these institutions
also purchase claims on households, thus affording individuals further
financial transformation opportunities on their own account.
What determines the breakdown of these transformation activities
among the corporate, financial institution, and household sectors? If the
process of transforming asset characteristics were costless, then, as the
Modigliani-Miller theorem implies, the allocation of these activities
across sectors would be indeterminate. If the process is costly, on the
other hand, agents in the various sectors may have access to different
transformation technologies, and the scope and allocation of these activi-
ties will be determined by the principles of comparative advantage and
cost minimization.
If we think of the supply and demand for substitutions of corporate
debt for equity, as discussed in conjunction with the diagrams of section
1.2, the shapes and locations of the curves will be determined by the
nature of these financial transformation technologies. The supply curve,
for example, represents the corporate sector's technology for transform-
ing the returns on its assets from equity claims into debt. If this technol-
ogy is costless, the supply curve is flat at the level of the certainty-
equivalent return on equity, as in the Modigliani-Miller model. If there is
a constant corporate tax advantage per dollar of debt, the supply curve is61 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
flat at the higher level Rel(\ - tc), as in the Miller model. In effect, the
corporate sector's transformation technology exhibits constant returns to
scale in this case, and thus the equilibrium corporate financing mix is
determinate at the sectoral level but not at the individual firm level.
Moreover, both the agency costs and tax savings-bankruptcy costs mod-
els can be viewed in this light as simply descriptions of the transformation
technology on the supply side.
The demand side of the market reflects the competition that corpora-
tions face from both financial institutions and households themselves in
performing these transformation activities. The more highly developed
the financial intermediary system and the broader and less costly the
range of transformation opportunities possessed by households on their
own account, the less likely it is that corporate debt will possess unique
characteristics and the more elastic the demand for this debt will be. In
most existing capital structure theories, it is implicit either that investors
can costlessly create perfect substitutes for corporate debt on their own
account or that financial intermediaries can create such substitutes for
them at no cost to the investors. Hence, corporate debt can be substituted
for equity without limit at the same terms of trade. It is only in the Miller
model that households face a costly transformation technology because
of the costs of tax arbitrage activities.
4
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Existing capital structure theories, then, frequently adopt asymmetric
views of the relationship between the corporate sector's financial trans-
formation technology and the technologies faced by other sectors in the
economy. In both the tax savings-bankruptcy costs and the agency costs
models, for example, financial transformation is costly for corporations
and the cost varies with the amount of transformation performed. For
investors, on the other hand, such transformation activities are costless.
One could argue that any asymmetry in the costs of financial trans-
formation faced by the corporate and household sectors might more
plausibly go in the other direction. If there are economies in monitoring
one large borrower rather than a number of smaller ones, for instance, or
if investors face such restrictions as margin limits, financial transforma-
tion might be more costly for households than for the corporate sector.
To see how corporate capital structure might be determined under these
conditions, we next examine a simple model of such an environment.
1.4.2 A Model of Capital Structure Determination
When Transformation Is Less Costly for
Corporations Than for Households
To take an extreme case for illustrative purposes, let us suppose that
borrowing is prohibitively costly for the household sector but that it
entails no costs at all, other than interest, for corporations. In order to
highlight the effect of these transformation costs, we will assume away all62 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
taxes. We will also ignore, for the time being, the possible existence of
financial intermediaries, and we will assume that corporations start out
relying exclusively on equity financing.
Initially, then, the only savings vehicle available to individuals is hold-
ings of (risky) corporate shares. They will trade until all individuals place
the same marginal valuation on these shares. As shown in Appendix B,
these marginal valuations consist of two components: the marginal value
of a dollar of certain future income plus an adjustment for risk. Because
there is no separate trading in risk-free securities, however, these sepa-
rate components need not be equal across individuals.
The yield on equity securities, re, thus reflects an average of investors'
valuations of certain prospects plus an average of their required risk
adjustments. But if part of corporations' return streams could be split off
and sold separately as riskless securities, these could be sold at a premium
price (lower certainty-equivalent yield) to the most risk-averse segment
of the investing public.
4
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Corporations might try to profit from this repackaging activity, but
competition would eliminate any gains in equilibrium. Since financial
transformation has been assumed to be costless for corporations, the
supply curve of corporate debt would be perfectly elastic at the level re.
That is, corporations would be willing to freely substitute debt for equity
financing as long as their certainty-equivalent yields were the same.
Investors, on the other hand, would demand progressively higher yields
to purchase additional increments of debt, since this additional debt
would have to be sold to progressively less risk-averse segments of the
investing population. Just as in Miller's model, then, restrictions on
investors' transformation opportunities cause the demand curve for cor-
porate debt to be upward sloping. As is depicted in figure 1.12, equi-
librium is reached in this model when corporations have issued that
amount of debt, B*, that is sufficient to drive the cost of debt, r, into
equality with re.
As in Miller's model, corporate capital structure is determinate at the
aggregate level here, but not at the level of the individual firm. Because of
trading restrictions on investors, there is a demand for the corporate
sector's transformation services, and firms compete with one another to
supply these services. Since all firms compete on equal terms, however,
profits from financial transformation are squeezed out, and the most
risk-averse investors reap a "bondholders' surplus," just as those inves-
tors in the lowest tax brackets do in Miller's model.
In addition, we might suppose that a government suddenly sprang up
and issued an amount of government bonds, G, that were perfect substi-
tutes for corporate debt. Since these bonds would tend to drive up the
relative yields on corporate bonds above re, corporations would start
substituting equity for debt and equilibrium corporate leverage would be63 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
Fig. 1.12 Equilibrium when investors face costly financial transforma-
tion but firms do not.
reduced. Costly financial transformation in the household sector, then, is
capable of yielding the same kind of substitution relationship between
corporate securities and other sectors' securities that occurs in Miller's
model. This relationship occurs here, moreover, in the complete absence
of taxes.
The transaction costs that impart positive slope to the demand curve in
this model are, of course, unrealistically severe. In practice, one would
expect firms to face competition in their efforts to overcome transaction
costs through financial transformation. Overcoming such costs and help-
ing to satisfy divergent investor demands, in fact, is one of the primary
rationales given for the existence of financial intermediaries.
In general, then, not only the corporate sector but also the financial
intermediary and household sectors will have access to financial trans-
formation technologies. To the extent that the corporate sector's technol-
ogy exhibits cost advantages over those of other sectors, the corporate
sector will tailor its financing mix to exploit these advantages. Demand
curves for corporate securities will be upward sloping in this case because
the financial transformations of the corporate sector cannot be duplicated
at comparable cost. Exogenous shifts in the supplies of noncorporate
securities, moreover, will shift these demand curves and thus cause
changes in the equilibrium corporate financing mix.
To the extent that financial intermediaries or investors themselves can
transform return streams at relatively low cost, on the other hand,
demand curves for corporate securities will be highly elastic. Shifts in
relative security supplies, in this case, can be easily accommodated in
investors' portfolios, and thus they necessitate no changes in the corpo-
rate sector's financing mix. In addition, it might be reasonable to expect64 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
that the progression from the first case, in which demand curves for
corporate securities are relatively less elastic, to the second case, in which
these curves are highly elastic, would bear some relationship to the
development of the capital market over time. In less developed periods,
when investors face a less plentiful array of financial transformation
opportunities, one would expect the intermediation role of corporate
finance to be relatively important. As the capital market develops,
however, and as investors come to rely less on the corporate sector for
financial transformation, this role would be expected to diminish.
1.4.3 Conclusion
The foregoing discussion, of course, need not rule out such factors as
tax considerations and the agency costs of corporate finance. The essen-
tial point is simply that such costs should be recognized on both sides of
the market, particularly if one is interested in interpreting corporate
financing patterns over long periods of time.
In general, then, both the demand and supply curves for corporate
securities may exhibit less than perfect elasticity. The shape and position
of the supply curve for corporate debt will reflect such aspects of the
corporate sector's transformation technology as agency costs, the costs of
issuing and servicing securities, and corporate taxes. The shape of the
demand curve reflects the transformation technology available to inves-
tors, either on their own account or through financial intermediaries. In
short, it reflects the range of portfolio opportunities open to investors and
the costs of switching among them.
In principle, this augmented version of the Miller model with agency
costs is capable of offering a richer interpretation of the capital structure
trends discussed in section 1.1. The analysis there confirmed previous
studies' findings of greater corporate debt financing in the post-World
War II period. Nevertheless, the evidence further suggested that corpo-
rate reliance on debt financing was unusually low around World War II
and that current debt proportions are not entirely out of line with those
experienced in the earlier decades of the century.
Since the study has encompassed periods when the current tax system
did not exist, tax considerations alone do not explain these overall trends.
Instead, the augmented theory described here would suggest the follow-
ing interpretation: In the early decades of the century, corporations may
have played a more substantial intermediary role than has been true in
recent decades. Investors' demands for relatively safe, fixed-dollar claims
were not met to such a degree in the earlier decades by either the
government or financial institutions as has been the case in more recent
times. These factors may help account for the relatively high proportion
of debt in total corporate financing and for the relatively high proportion65 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
of corporate debt in total domestic liabilities in the early part of the
century. In the years following the Depression, however, this intermedi-
ary role of corporate debt has probably been reduced, both by increased
relative supplies of federal government and household mortgage debt
and by the increased extent of financial intermediation.
4
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By the present time, the markets both for corporate debt and for
corporate stock have become heavily institutionalized, and it would be
much more difficult to describe convincingly an overt intermediary role
played by these securities. Nevertheless, tax rates and inflation in the
postwar years have combined with the declining relative size of federal
government debt to stimulate corporate debt financing again. Although
corporate debt has never approached its earlier importance relative to
total domestic liabilities, corporations' reliance on debt financing relative
to equity has returned, by some measures at least, to roughly the propor-
tions experienced in the early part of the century.
The augmented theory of the aggregate corporate capital structure
described in this section has several points in its favor. First, it is consist-
ent with the apparent inverse relationship between supplies of federal
government and corporate debt, even in the absence of taxes. Second, it
is capable of describing the interaction between the corporate sector's
financing patterns and the secular development of the capital market and
its institutions. The growth of pension funds, for example, would be
expected to have alleviated some of the lack of substitutability between
debt and equity securities induced by personal tax considerations. De-
velopment of these institutions, therefore, may have caused the demand
curve for corporate debt to become more highly elastic. Finally, this
theory is capable of explaining more corporate financing patterns than
just the debt-equity mix. It is widely held, for instance, that recent
interest rate volatility has made it increasingly dangerous for financial
institutions to intermediate between long-term financial assets and short-
term liabilities. This may account in part, then, for the shift in corporate
liabilities toward increasingly short maturities.
4
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It is clear that many details still remain to be filled in. In particular, if
the costs of financial transformation are an important element in the
corporate sector's financing behavior, one would like a better under-
standing of these costs and of where, specifically, corporations might be
expected to possess a comparative advantage over financial institutions
and individual investors. In addition, hypotheses should be developed
about the ways in which technological and regulatory changes alter these
comparative advantages.
4
7 On the basis of the data examined in this
paper, however, further development of an aggregate capital structure
theory along the lines suggested here appears to offer some promise for
explaining the secular patterns in corporate finance.66 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
Appendix A
The Net Effect of an Increase in Corporate Tax Rates
on Equilibrium Corporate Debt
The numerator of expression (2) in the text can only be less than or
equal to zero if
(Ai)
r0) \-tc
Note, however, that if X represents the annual, certainty-equivalent,
pretax operating cash flow for the corporate sector as a whole, then the
aggregate market value, 5, of corporate equity is given by
s=(XrB){lQJ^_BU
Discounting in expression (A2) is done at the tax-exempt rate since in
Miller's model corporate equity is tax exempt by assumption.
If we then increase tc and abstract from any changes in the absolute
level of security yields, the resulting change in the aggregate value of
corporate equity is given by
(A3) AS-
If condition (Al) holds, however, AS must be nonnegative. Therefore, if
an increase in tc fails to increase the equilibrium amount of corporate
debt, it will also fail to reduce the aggregate market value of corporate
equity. It seems unlikely, though, that an increase in corporate taxes
would increase the value of corporate equity. Thus, as long as the change
in relative yields is small enough that the value of equity declines, an
increase in the corporate tax rate will also increase equilibrium corporate
leverage in the Miller model.
Appendix B
Investors' Valuation of Corporate Stock
When No Riskless Asset Is Traded
Individuals, i, have initial endowments of cash, y[, as well as initial
fractional shareholdings, a\ in the aggregate market value of corporate
equity, V. There is no second-period endowment, so individuals must67 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
make a consumption-saving decision that maximizes the expected utility,
E\U
l), of first- and second-period consumption, C{ and Cj. As noted in
the text, the only available savings vehicle is holdings of corporate shares.
Firms in the aggregate are assumed to be subject to the same uncer-
tainty, and thus the shares of one firm are viewed as perfect substitutes for
those of any other firm. We will ignore distinctions among firms, then,
and simply think of the corporate sector in the aggregate. The aggregate
net income of firms in the second period is QX, where O is a random
variable. In general, individuals may differ in their views of the distribu-
tion of 9 and their subjective probability density functions will be de-
noted by /'(0).
A representative individual's consumption-saving problem is
(Bl) maxJU
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Using the fact that cov (A B) = E(AB) - E(A)E(B), where A and B are
any two random variables, (B4) may be written as
(B5) f/£'•(£%)£'•(§) , cov(g6)\
I E\U{) E\Ui) }'
That is, each individual buys or sells shares until his personal valuation of
corporate equity is exactly equal to the market's valuation, V.
As indicated by the right-hand side of (B5), however, the individual's
personal valuation has two components, which need not be equal separ-
ately for all individuals. If we assume away differences in expectations for
the moment and let E
l(Q) = 1 for all individuals, the first component,
E(U2)/E(U[), can be thought of as a personal discount factor for certain
prospects, and the second component can be thought of as a personal68 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
risk-adjustment factor. From (B5), those investors with higher certainty
discount factors (that is, those who place a higher value on certain future
consumption) must have correspondingly larger (i.e., more negative)
risk-adjustment factors.
If we aggregate by summing (B5), weighted by individual sharehold-
ings, over all individuals, the result is
(B6) wr-r-J
• E(U[)
and the cost of equity financing to the corporate sector may be expressed
as
(B7) -= - —.
V _
t E{U{) i E{U{)
That is, the cost of equity is determined by weighted averages of inves-
tors' certainty discount factors and risk-adjustment factors. Further-
more, since the second term in the denominator of (B6) can be thought of
as the overall market risk-adjustment factor, the market certainty-




If firms were now to begin substituting some risk-free debt financing for
equity, those investors with the highest certainty discount factors (that is,
those placing the highest personal value on this debt) would be the first to
buy it. Since these investors would have higher-than-average certainty
discount factors relative to the market as a whole, (B8) indicates that they
would be willing to accept a yield lower than re on at least an initial
increment of risk-free corporate debt.
Notes
1. Academic studies of aggregate corporate financing patterns include Goldsmith (1958,
1963), Lintner (1960), Kuznets (1961), Miller (1963), Sametz (1964), Friedman (1980), and
Gordon and Malkiel (1981). Business journalists have also surveyed trends in aggregate
financial ratios, particularly in conjunction with the "capital shortage" discussions that were
popular in the mid-1970s. See, for example, Business Week (1974).
2. Examples include Friedman (1980) and Gordon and Malkiel (1981). Discussions in
the business press have also tended to emphasize deterioration in corporation balance
sheets. Business Week (1974) is a good example.69 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
3. Studies emphasizing stability in debt-equity proportions include Lintner (1960),
Miller (1963), and Sametz (1964). Updated versions of these arguments also appear in
Miller (1977) and Sametz and Keenan (1981).
4. Among the exceptions are Miller (1977) and Gordon and Malkiel (1981).
5. Miller's (1977) paper was perhaps the first to provide a theory explicitly aimed at the
aggregate corporate capital structure.
6. The total-debt-to-total-assets ratio was not examined by Miller.
7. After 1961, the IRS generally stopped reporting separate figures for preferred stock.
8. Distortions in the opposite direction can also occur, however. For example, book-
value debt ratios may be understated by the omission of such "off-balance-sheet" financing
sources as leases and unfunded pension liabilities. The use of these sources is believed to
have grown tremendously in the 1960s and 1970s. One indication of the possible magnitude
of this understatement is given in Gordon and Malkiel (1981). They calculate the ratio of
debt to debt plus equity for the aggregate of firms included on the Compustat tape. Since
1973 the data on the tape include lease and pension liabilities. The ratios with and without
these liabilities are as follows:
Debt Ratio without Debt Ratio including







9. See Modigliani and Cohn (1979), however, for an argument that the market does not
properly adjust for inflation in determining equity values. By their argument, market-value
debt ratios would be substantially overstated in recent years.
10. Myers (1977), for example, has argued that a firm's capacity to issue debt is closely
related to its assets-in-place. The total market value of assets, on the other hand, reflects not
only assets-in-place, but also future investment opportunities, and Myers points out that
firms may not find it advantageous to borrow against these opportunities. Thus the replace-
ment value of assets, which reflects only assets-in-place, may be a better measure of debt
capacity. However, assets-in-place will be overstated to the extent that replacement value
figures include assets that firms would not be willing to replace.
11. One problem is that von Furstenberg's measure of debt is different from Gold-
smith's. In von Furstenberg, non-interest-bearing liabilities have been netted out against
the asset side of the balance sheet, while interest-bearing financial assets have been netted
out against the liability side in computing this ratio. To make the figures as closely
comparable as possible, the same procedure has been used in calculating debt ratios from
Goldsmith's data. Nevertheless, the detail in Goldsmith's data is not the same as that in the
Flow of Funds Accounts, from which von Furstenberg worked, and thus we would not
expect the ratios to be identical.
12. To the extent that some investment expenditures, such as research and develop-
ment, are expensed immediately, however, the extent of equity financing may still be
understated somewhat. There are also other problems inherent in Flow of Funds data. Von
Furstenberg and Malkiel (1977) discuss the distortions resulting from failure to recognize
the reduction in the real value of previously outstanding debt caused by inflation. In
addition, the Flow of Funds Accounts published by the Federal Reserve System lump
preferred stock financing together with common equity financing.
13. It could be argued that this interpretation of Modigliani-Miller is excessively literal70 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
and that we should view it as an equilibrium tendency rather than as a law that holds instant
by instant. Brealey and Myers (1981), for example, conclude their chap. 17 with an
equilibrium tendency version of the Modigliani-Miller argument. Nevertheless, the more
stringent version depicted in figure 2.4 is representative, I believe, of the way the Mo-
digliani-Miller argument is usually interpreted in formal finance theory. It is certainly the
version that is consistent with a complete market model. See Litzenberger and Sosin (1977)
for a discussion of related points.
14. The financial institution sector is introduced in Stiglitz's (1974) generalization of
Modigliani-Miller. Even if financial transformation were costly for households on their own
account, their demand for corporate debt would still be perfectly elastic if financial interme-
diaries could costlessly perform these services.
15. Examples of this theory may be found in Robichek and Myers (1966), Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973), and Kim (1978).
16. Implicitly, there are no personal taxes, or at least corporate debt and equity secu-
rities are subject to identical tax treatment at the personal level. When the model is
discussed in the analysis that follows, it will be assumed that there are no personal taxes.
17. Certainty-equivalent returns on debt here are net of those agency costs (such as
monitoring expenses) borne directly by bondholders. The downward slope in the debt
supply curve reflects increases in both these agency costs (which are passed back to firms'
owner-managers) and in those (such as bonding expenses or opportunities forgone) borne
directly by the owner-managers. See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for further discussion.
18. In the simplest version of Miller's model, equity is assumed to be free from personal
taxation. Thus re, the certainty-equivalent return on equity, is the same as the cer-
tainty-equivalent return, r0, on tax-exempt bonds.
19. An example of such a model is Myers (1977), in which debt is subject to an agency
cost but equity is not. In the absence of taxes, the supply curve for debt would slope
downward starting from re, and in equilibrium no debt would be issued. When corporate
taxes are introduced, however, the supply curve shifts upward and there is a positive
equilibrium quantity of debt.
20. See, for instance, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) or Barnea et al. (1981). The models
of Gordon and Malkiel (1981) and Modigliani (1982) can also be interpreted in this vein. It is
a semantic nicety, in fact, whether such models are classified as "Miller models with agency
costs" or tax savings-bankruptcy costs models adjusted for personal taxes. For simplicity,
the former label will be applied in the ensuing discussion.
21. All of the comparative statics exercises in this section are of the partial equilibrium
variety in that they concentrate on changes in r relative to re but do not consider changes in
the absolute level of security yields induced by changes in aggregate wealth.
22. It is easily verified that an increase in tp alone reduces B*.
23. As in Miller's model, the presence of tax-exempt investors would lead to an initial
horizontal segment (at the rate re) in the demand curve for preferred stock. In addition,
because of the 85% intercorporate dividend exclusion, corporate investors would demand
the same certainty-equivalent return on preferred stock that they would on dividend-paying
common stock. Corporate demand for preferred stock, then, would further extend the
horizontal segment of the demand curve. Eventually, however, additional preferred stock
would have to be purchased by taxable investors, and this would impart an upward slope to
the demand curve.
24. This effect is discussed by Modigliani (1982), who labels it "Super Fisher's Law."
25. McDonald (1983) has derived a similar result by somewhat different means.
26. The Gordon-Malkiel (1981) model, which combines tax considerations with bank-
ruptcy costs, reaches a similar conclusion. This finding is also consistent with Modigliani's
(1982) analysis.
27. A further interaction between inflation and the tax system has been pointed out by
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). They argue that such items as depreciation provide substi-71 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
tute tax shelters and thus limit the firm's ability to benefit from the tax deductibility of
interest. Since an increase in inflation reduces the real value of depreciation and other tax
shields, however, the firm is then encouraged to substitute debt for equity financing in order
to further shelter its real income.
28. Results similar to those in both of these exercises have been derived independently
by McDonald (1983).
29. See Kim et al. (1979) and Taggart (1980) for discussions of how investors in different
tax brackets sort themselves into clienteles with respect to their preferences for corporate
leverage. At Miller's equilibrium, the marginal investor will have tpB = tc and 8 = 0.
Furthermore, this investor will be just indifferent between holding taxable and tax-exempt
bonds, so for him r(l - tpB) = r0. In equilibrium, then, 8 = 1 - (1 - fc)/(l - tpB) = 1 - r(l - tc)lr(\ - tpB) = 1 - r(l - tc)/r0 - 0, and thus expression (8) is consistent with expression (1).
30. In 1973, for example, investors who paid taxes at marginal rates greater than the
statutory corporate rate accounted for just 3.57% of the economy's taxable income (Pech-
man 1977, App. B). If taxable income is at all related to wealth (another treacherous
assumption), this may suggest that the aversion to corporate leverage on the part of
high-tax-bracket investors was not very important. The presence of tax-exempt investors
could also add to the demand for corporate leverage.
31. The upward trend in corporate tax rates is also broadly consistent with the secular
decline in preferred stock financing, at least in terms of the Miller model with agency costs,
as was seen in the subsection "An Aside on Taxes and Preferred Stock" in section 1.2.2.
32. In principle, expected rates of inflation would be preferred. Over long periods, one
might expect at least a rough correspondence between expected and realized inflation rates.
Another potential measurement problem stems from the possibility that higher inflation
rates may be associated with greater uncertainty about relative price changes. To the extent
that this is in turn associated with increased business risk, there may be an offsetting
influence on corporate debt usage.
33. This increase in debt financing is particularly apparent if one examines yearly Flow of
Funds data. In 1946 and 1947, for example, the years of greatest inflation around that
period, total debt accounted for 52% and 49%, respectively, of total sources of funds for the
corporate sector. In large part this increased debt financing was accounted for by heavy
reliance on short-term liabilities, which made up 33% and 29%, respectively, of total
sources.
34. The supply of government debt might reasonably be viewed as exogenous to the
system. Observed amounts of household mortgages, on the other hand, will presumably be
more affected by prevailing capital market yields.
35. To the extent that tax considerations and their interaction with inflation have
affected corporate liabilities and household mortgages in the same direction, this may not be
surprising.
36. See Holland and Myers (1979) for a good discussion of the pitfalls in interpreting
measured q values.
37. Use of the same data for q and for the financing ratios may entail some spurious
correlation, however.
38. Williamson (1981) has had some success in using this theory to explain observed
capital structures of individual firms.
39. Column 3 of table 1.10 is derived by multiplying the standard deviation of stock
returns by one minus the market-debt-to-value ratio. This is a good measure of business risk
or the standard deviation of unlevered asset returns if (i) debt is risk-free, (ii) preferred
stock is negligible in magnitude, and (iii) leverage has no effect on overall firm value. All
three assumptions are questionable here, and thus the measure is very rough. See Hamada
(1972) for a discussion of the problem of measuring business risk.
40. It would be tautological, of course, to say that the model with the most explanatory72 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
variables has the greatest explanatory power. What is being asserted here is that there are
economically significant trends that the simpler models are incapable of explaining.
41. The widely used "complete" market model would be one in which these conditions
are satisfied. Weaker conditions than market completeness (the "spanning" assumption,
for example) would also be sufficient to generate perfectly elastic demands for securities if
corporate financing choices were confined to traditional debt and equity securities.
42. A considerable literature exists, tracing this process of capital market development
with particular emphasis on the role of financial institutions. See, for example, Davis and
North (1971), Silber (1975), and James (1978).
43. See Barnea et al. (1981) for further elaboration on the role of tax arbitrage restric-
tions in making this demand curve imperfectly elastic.
44. Differences in investor expectations could play a similar role. Firms could try to gain
by selling riskless securities to the most pessimistic segment of investors.
45. In the immediate post-Depression years, investors probably also became increas-
ingly skeptical about the safety of corporate debt.
46. Ultimately, this involves a shift in the bearing of interest rate risk from shareholders
and other owners of financial institutions and from liability insurance agencies to the
shareholders of nonfinancial corporations. A more complete explanation would detail the
mechanism by which such a shift might take place. In particular, the stance of financial
institution regulators might be an important factor.
47. See Greenbaum and Haywood (1971) for a discussion of the role of technology and
regulation in circumscribing the intermediate possibilities open to financial institutions.
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Comment John Lintner
The first section of this paper provides a very useful overview and
synthesis of the evidence regarding the secular patterns in the relative use
of debt and equity financing by corporations developed in the classic
studies of Goldsmith, von Furstenberg, Holland and Myers, and others.
These earlier studies have used book or market or replacement cost
valuations to measure the relative stocks of debt and equity securities, or
have turned to flow-of-funds data. Each of these individual series mea-
sures a different aspect of the underlying reality and raises its own
problems of possible bias and measurement error. Taggart's convenient
tables also remind us that the levels of corporate leverage reported in
different studies using the same concepts for overlapping dates frequently
differ substantially. The issues raised by these observations would have
required much further detailed investigation if the author had intended to
develop econometric tests of the adequacy of any (or of any combination)
of our models to explain the year-to-year levels and fluctuations in
corporate leverage. But Taggart's objectives in this paper are more
broad-brush and qualitative. His focus is on using the available evidence
simply to identify the broader trends and stronger tides in the relative use
of corporate debt and equity over the eight decades for which estimates
are available—the trends and tides which theory should be able to explain
in terms of a comparative static analysis.
In spite of the imperfections and differences in the various separate
series, Taggart is able to show that there is often, if not always, substan-
tial agreement regarding the general stability or the relative increase or
decrease in the use of corporate leverage over various intervals of five or
ten years or more.
1 The agreement among all the series in showing a
massive increase in the relative use of debt over the last fifteen or twenty
years is simply the most dramatic and best known of the instances of
common broad movements (or stability) he points out. Taggart also adds
useful perspective on this recent experience by observing that equally
high levels of leverage measured in market values (or relative to the
Until his death, John Lintner was George Gund Professor of Economics and Business
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replacement cost of assets) were common in the 1930s, and that Gold-
smith's data show even higher levels early in this century when inflation
was mild and there were no income taxes. While readers familiar with the
underlying literature may not be especially surprised at any of the conclu-
sions, this survey and summary of the available evidence will serve to
sharpen our perspectives on what the longer-term patterns in the financ-
ing of corporate assets and investments have been.
The rest of the paper summarizes, reinterprets, tests, and finally ex-
tends the existing body of corporate financial theory in an effort to
understand and explain the various stabilities and secular movements in
the relative use of debt financing identified in the first section. Of the
many models of corporate capital structure which have been developed in
recent years, only Miller's "debt and taxes" and its successors directly
provide a determinate equilibrium for the aggregate capital structure of
the corporate sector as a whole. Optimal debt-to-equity ratios in the
original Modigliani-Miller models were of course indeterminate at both
the firm and the corporate sector levels. The numerous other theories
have all concentrated on deriving the optimal mix of financing for indi-
vidual firms under different sets of conditions in a partial equilibrium
setting. For expositional convenience, along with the original Miller
macro model, Taggart groups the rich set of micro models which have
been developed in recent years into three generic types: the union of tax
savings and bankruptcy cost theories, agency cost theories, and Miller's
model combined with agency costs. Taggart then handles the aggregation
problems involved in deriving the implications of these various micro
theories for the equilibrium values of sector-wide totals of debt and
equity financing by recasting the theories in terms of supply and demand
curves expressed as functions of what are described as certainty-
equivalent rates of return.
On careful examination, however, this description of the functions as
certainty equivalents is inappropriate and potentially misleading. In the
presence of a riskless asset, the marginal certainty-equivalent rate of
return on all risk assets is equal to the riskless rate.
2 In particular, this is
true for all outstanding issues of debt and equity securities, regardless of
their relative volumes for each firm or for the corporate sector as a whole.
Rather than certainty equivalents, Taggart's supply and demand func-
tions are denominated in terms of required expected rates of return
throughout. They are simply normalized relative to the rate of return
required on outstanding equity in the limiting case of an all-equity capi-
talization, or alternatively normalized on the rate which borrowers would
just be willing to pay (or lenders would just be willing to accept) on the
first dollar of debt issued, as the case may be. Each generic theory
specifies the all-equity intercept of either the supply or demand function
as its primary benchmark. It then derives the intercept of the other77 Secular Patterns in the Financing of Corporations
function relative to this point by allowing for the initial impact of the
factors, such as taxes or agency or bankruptcy costs, which are being
analyzed. Once the two intercepts have been located, the shapes, slopes,
and derivatives of both the supply and demand functions as more debt is
added under the specified conditions are inferred and the sector-wide
equilibrium at their point of intersection or equality is determined. At
each stage, all measurements are in terms of expected rates of return
rather than certainty equivalents.
When properly described and understood in this way, Taggart's recast-
ing of the major micro theories brings out interesting and useful compari-
sons between them both in his text and in his summary diagrams. It also
handles the aggregation problem in a very convenient way,
3 and it facili-
tates the derivation of the predictions of each theory regarding the
qualitative comparative static effects on aggregate debt-to-equity ratios
of changes in various contextual factors.
The predictions of each of Taggart's generic model types for the broad
effects on corporate financial ratios of changes in corporate and personal
tax rates, in inflation, in the costs associated with corporate debt, in the
supplies of tax-exempt or of noncorporate taxable bonds, and in growth
opportunities relative to assets in place are derived in the second section
and conveniently summarized in table 1.5. The simpler types of models
focus on only one or two of these determining factors and ignore the
others, but, as would be expected, whenever any two models include a
common determining factor, they are in complete agreement regarding
the impact of a change in that factor. While the separate discussions of the
location and shapes of the sectoral supply and demand functions in each
model are instructive and nicely set the stage for Taggart's own "aug-
mented theory" in the final section of the paper, these generic models are
seen to be quite compatible and complementary.
The third section examines the ability of existing theory to explain the
secular movements in corporate capital structures, drawing on many
decades of annual data on corporate and personal tax rates, "net debt
incentive tax ratios," inflation rates, Tobin's q values, yearly standard
deviations of monthly stock market returns, and the relative supplies of
corporate and noncorporate securities. Taggart carefully and informa-
tively compares the fluctuations in each series with the observed secular
trends in corporate financial patterns. Not surprisingly, he finds that
secular fluctuations in corporate debt-to-equity ratios are not adequately
explained by any of these factors. Each factor is associated with debt
ratios in the way theory predicts over parts of the record, but in each case
the expected association is not found during other periods. But however
convenient and constructive this one-on-one analysis may be, this part of
the paper generally has the character of an examination of the time-series
residuals in a series of simple regressions. The important interactions of78 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
tax rates and inflation are recognized, but the other causal factors are
considered separately. Further research to explain these secular trends
will have to move on to examine the net effects of each of the causal
factors while appropriately taking into account the simultaneous effects
of others. In addition, there are important interactions between these
other factors which will have to be analyzed and allowed for—notably
those between different risk and agency costs and tax rates.
Even though Taggart did not explicitly carry through this further
analysis, he must have done so implicitly and judgmentally, for he clearly
believes that all of the factors listed in his table 1.5 are important, though
partial, determinants of corporate debt-to-equity ratios. This is the basis
for his further conclusion that the Miller model combined with agency
costs explains the broad fluctuations in these financial ratios more ade-
quately than any of the three other generic models considered. The
original Miller or agency cost models, and even the popular tax savings
and bankruptcy cost models, all leave out various factors which appear to
be empirically significant, while the Miller-cum-agency cost model in
effect is treated as the union of all the elements in the others.
But Taggart regards even this inclusive model as not fully adequate to
explain the historical record. He observes that the demand function for
corporate debt will become more elastic as capital markets become more
fully developed and competitive and as transactions costs and trading
restrictions are reduced. Similarly, the position and curvature of this
demand function over time will reflect changes in the structure of the set
of financial intermediaries and financial instruments available to inves-
tors in the economy. He shows that variations in all these major aspects of
the broader institutional context of corporate financial decisions, as well
as exogenous changes in the relative supplies of noncorporate securities,
will affect the equilibrium debt-to-equity ratios for the corporate sector,
other things equal, even in the complete absence of taxes and agency and
bankruptcy costs. When the latter factors are reintroduced, the resulting
augmented version of the Miller-cum-agency costs model helps to ex-
plain several important but otherwise rather puzzling features of the
historical trends in corporate capital structures, which are discussed in the
final section.
As I studied the paper, I was somewhat surprised that Taggart did not
explicitly identify and develop some additional determinants of corporate
debt-to-equity ratios. Some of these are implicitly suggested in his text,
while others are not. In particular, Taggart properly recognizes that the
absence of complete markets and the presence of agency and bankruptcy
costs make investment and financing decisions interdependent. The
optimal debt ratio for any ongoing firm similarly depends on the unsys-
tematic (as well as the systematic) risks of its assets in place.
4 To at least a
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which the firm operates, and it is well known that there are clear and
remarkably persistent patterns in the relative use of debt financing by
firms in different industries. All this clearly suggests that a considerable
part of the variation in aggregate corporate debt-to-equity ratios may
have reflected shifts in the relative volumes of total financing required by
different industries—due for instance to shifts in the relative growth in
demands for their output—rather than to shifts in economy-wide factors
such as tax rates or inflation. During a period when the total capitaliza-
tion of such heavily levered industries as hotels and electric utilities
increases relative to that of such industries as soft drink manufacturers or
industrial chemicals, the overall corporate debt-to-equity ratio will rise
even if nothing else is happening.
Similarly, just as the distribution of income and the pattern of progres-
sion in personal tax rates affect the elasticity of the demand for corporate
debt in the original Miller model, it is clear from Taggart's analysis that
shifts in the distribution of wealth as well as of income among individual
investors will shift this demand curve in his augmented model. While the
available data on the distributions of income and wealth are rather rough,
they may help explain debt usage over time by way of various clientele
effects. The data on nondebt corporate tax shields are much more solid,
and the direction of their net effect is quite clear. The depressing impact
on equilibrium debt ratios of the veritable explosion in these other tax
shields over the last decade or so clearly needs to be allowed for in
assessing the true explanatory power of other factors. The excess profits
taxes imposed during World War II and the Korean War should also be
mentioned and taken into account. Finally, it should be observed that
Taggart generally discusses the adequacy of each explanatory factor by
comparing the contemporaneous movements in corporate debt-to-equity
ratios and the series in question. It is becoming increasingly clear that
corporations have target (equilibrium) debt-to-equity ratios, just as they
have target dividend payout ratios, and that as conditions change they
progressively but partially adjust their immediate position toward the
equilibrium value.
5 This suggests that in future work, even that intended
to explain only the secular trends and broader movements in debt ratios,
it would be advisable to allow for appropriate lags between the explana-
tory series and the debt ratios being investigated.
These various observations, however, are in the nature of suggestions
for further refinements and extensions in future research on these issues,
building on what is already a very broad-ranging, insightful, and com-
mendable piece of work. In particular, Taggart's review and augmenta-
tion of our received theory has been very constructive and useful, and the
paper as a whole has considerably enriched our understanding of the
major trends in corporate financing over the last century.80 Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
Notes
1. The major exceptions are of course found in comparisons between series based on
book values with those based on either market values or replacement costs.
2. This property is explicitly derived in Lintner (1969, p. 356) and shown to hold when
investors have differing (as well as common) probability assessments. When there is no
riskless asset (as when inflation is uncertain), the marginal certainty-equivalent real rates of
return on all assets in every investor's portfolio again have a common value equal to the
shadow value of his wealth constraint—i. e., his marginal real certainty-equivalent of ending
wealth (pp. 373-77). This is of course true even when short-selling constraints are effective
(pp. 389 ff.). Alternatively, when the objective function is expressed as the utility of a
stream of consumption, the marginal certainty-equivalent real rate of return is the ratio of
the utility of an added dollar of certain future real consumption to that of a dollar of current
consumption. In both formulations, the marginal certainty-equivalent return in the absence
of a riskless asset will vary from investor to investor (even when probability assessments are
homogeneous), and the market value will involve weighted averages across investors.
3. The lateral summation of rising, horizontal or falling micro supply or demand func-
tions will produce macro functions with qualitatively the same characteristic. Similarly, the
displacement of any aggregated function will be qualitatively the same as that of its
component micro functions in response to the change of any common factor such as tax rates
or inflation.
4. This position is advanced, and some of its further implications are developed, in
Lintner (1982), esp. pp. 135-40.
5. The speed of adjustment of debt-to-equity ratios may of course be different than that
for dividends. This combined model was originally proposed in Lintner (1967).
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